{"id":363,"date":"2020-07-09T16:51:59","date_gmt":"2020-07-09T16:51:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/?page_id=363"},"modified":"2022-11-17T20:02:23","modified_gmt":"2022-11-17T20:02:23","slug":"publications","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/","title":{"rendered":"Papers"},"content":{"rendered":"
The Grounds of Our Freedom<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Inquiry<\/em>\u00a0(2022, symposium on Frankfurt’s alternative possibilities paper). I discuss the relation between freedom and grounding, especially in connection with views inspired by Frankfurt’s paper.<\/p>\n

Juggling Intuitions about Causation and Omissions<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In\u00a0Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Causation<\/em>\u00a0(Wiegmann and Willemsen, eds., 2022). I discuss the interplay between intuitions of different types in our theorizing about causation.<\/p>\n

Responsibility and Causation<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In\u00a0Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility\u00a0<\/em>(Nelkin and Pereboom, eds., 2022). I discuss the role that causation plays in both derivative and basic responsibility.<\/p>\n

The Concept of Responsibility in the Ethics of Self-Defense and War<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophical Studies<\/em>\u00a0(2021, symposium on responsibility and defensive harm). I discuss “Responsibility Views” in the ethics of self-defense and war, and the concept of responsibility at work in them.<\/p>\n

Indeterministic Compatibilism<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In\u00a0Free Will<\/em>: Historical and Analytic Perspectives<\/em>\u00a0(Hausmann and Noller, eds., 2021). I discuss some new puzzles that arise for free will compatibilism, under the assumption of indeterminism.<\/p>\n

Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Omissions<\/b><\/span><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

In\u00a0Non-Being: New Essays on Non-Existence<\/em>\u00a0(Bernstein and Goldschmidt, eds., 2021). I discuss the relevance of the metaphysics of omission and causation for our theorizing about moral responsibility.<\/p>\n

More of a Cause?<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Journal of Applied Philosophy\u00a0<\/em>(2020, symposium on causation and war). I argue against the idea that causal contributions come in degrees, and draw consequences for moral responsibility and the ethics of war.<\/p>\n

Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Midwest Studies in Philosophy\u00a0<\/em>(2019). Some have suggested that what we’re ultimately responsible for is not making decisions but making them “on our own.” I critically examine this view in connection with the problem of moral luck.<\/p>\n

Situations and Responsiveness to Reasons<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

No\u00fbs <\/em>(2018). I discuss how we can be responsive to reasons despite the “situationist” threat.<\/p>\n

The Puzzle(s) of Frankfurt-Style Omission Cases<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In The Ethics and Law of Omissions<\/em> (Nelkin and Rickless, eds., 2017). I discuss some interesting puzzles about responsibility by omission.<\/p>\n

Ignorance, Alternative Possibilities, and the Epistemic Conditions for Responsibility<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy<\/em> (Peels, ed., 2017). I argue that being blameworthy doesn\u2019t require the belief that one could have done otherwise, and draw some conclusions about the epistemic conditions for responsibility.<\/p>\n

Frankfurt-Style Examples<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Routledge Companion to Free Will<\/em> (Griffin, Levy, and Timpe, eds., 2017). A survey of Frankfurt-style examples, different roles they can play in free will debates, and potential new avenues of research.<\/p>\n

PAP-Style Cases<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Journal of Philosophy<\/em> (2016). I discuss the prospects of the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases (cases that aim to show that free will requires alternative possibilities).<\/p>\n

A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Journal of Ethics<\/em> (2016). I develop new arguments in support of the actual-sequence model of freedom.<\/p>\n

Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Criminal Law and Philosophy\u00a0<\/em>(2016). This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin\u2019s Causes, Laws, and Free Will<\/em> (OUP, 2013).<\/p>\n

Resultant Luck and the Thirsty Traveler<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Methode<\/em> (2015). My solution to the thirsty traveler puzzle (among other things).<\/p>\n

A New Form of Moral Luck?<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In Agency and Moral Responsibility<\/em> (Buckareff, Moya, and Rosell, eds., 2015). I discuss a particularly puzzling form of luck: one where our responsibility seems to depend exclusively on whether other responsible agents are present and what their contributions are.<\/p>\n

Sensitivity to Reasons and Actual Sequences<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility<\/em> (Shoemaker, ed., 2015). How can one hold that acting freely is a matter of being sensitive to (non-actual) reasons, and also hold that freedom is just a function of actual sequences? I argue for an answer in terms of the concept of absence causation.<\/p>\n

The Problem of Determinism and Free Will Is Not the Problem of Determinism and Free Will<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In Surrounding Free Will<\/em> (Mele, ed., 2015). I argue that the threat to our free will isn\u2019t determinism but determination by factors beyond our causal reach. I draw consequences for some free will debates.<\/p>\n

Difference-Making in Epistemology<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

(With Juan Comesa\u00f1a<\/a>) No\u00fbs<\/em> 48 (2014). We argue for a new difference-making constraint on evidence and justification. We show that the constraint sheds light on the easy knowledge problem.<\/p>\n

Making a Difference in a Deterministic World<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

The Philosophical Review<\/em> 122 (2013). I argue that responsibility is grounded in difference-making, in particular, in a form of difference-making that is compatible with determinism.<\/p>\n

Causation and Freedom<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Journal of Philosophy<\/em> 109 (2012). I argue that the metaphysics of causation has a neglected but important role to play in the debate about freedom and determinism. In particular, the intransitivity of causation can support a better version of the alternative possibilities view of freedom (as well as a rival view that doesn\u2019t require alternative possibilities).<\/p>\n

Two Wrongs Don\u2019t Make A Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Legal Theory<\/em> 18 (2012). This is part of a symposium on Michael Moore\u2019s book Causation and Responsibility<\/em>. I critically examine Moore\u2019s views on whether and how agents are responsible in overdetermination cases and then develop my own view on this issue.<\/p>\n

Resultant Luck<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research<\/em> 84 (2012). I give an account of the concept of resultant moral luck (moral luck about consequences), a concept that is, I argue, much more intricate and interesting than has been recognized.<\/p>\n

Actuality and Responsibility<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Mind<\/em> 120 (2011). \u201cActual-sequence\u201d views of responsibility are views according to which moral responsibility is a function of actual sequences. I argue that the best view of this kind is one that understands actual sequences in a non-traditional way and one that entails that unactualized possibilities of a certain kind are always relevant to responsibility.<\/p>\n

Moore on Doing versus Allowing Harm<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Rutgers Law Journal<\/em> 42 (2011). This is a critical discussion of Michael Moore\u2019s views on the doing\/allowing distinction in his book Causation and Responsibility<\/em> (Oxford, 2009).<\/p>\n

Failing to Do the Impossible<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In New Waves in the Philosophy of Action<\/em> (Aguilar, Frankish, and Buckareff, eds., 2010). I discuss the relation between intentional omissions and alternative possibilities.<\/p>\n

The Prince of Wales Problem for Counterfactual Theories of Causation<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In New Waves in Metaphysics<\/em> (Hazzlett, ed., 2010). I argue that counterfactual views of causation cannot accommodate causation by omission while remaining faithful to the motivation for accepting that kind of causation.<\/p>\n

Omissions and Causalism<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

No\u00fbs<\/em> 43 (2009). I argue that omissions make trouble for causal theories of agency.<\/p>\n

Causation And Ethics<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

In Oxford Handbook of Causation<\/em> (Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies, eds., 2009). I discuss the role of causation in consequentialism, the distinction between killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, and the concept of moral responsibility.<\/p>\n

Moral Inertia<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophical Studies<\/em> 140 (2008). I argue that, according to commonsense morality, there is moral pressure to leave things \u201cas is.\u201d<\/p>\n

Causation and Responsibility<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophy Compass<\/em> (2007). I discuss different views about the relation between moral responsibility and causation and I defend an unorthodox view.<\/p>\n

Disjunctive Causes<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Journal of Philosophy<\/em> 103 (2006). I argue that there is reason to believe in the existence of disjunctive causes.<\/p>\n

Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophical Perspectives<\/em> 20 (2006). It might seem that, if I cause X and Y, I also cause their sum. I argue that this principle fails, at least for omissions, and I draw some implications of this failure for the problem of famine.<\/p>\n

On Causing Something to Happen in a Certain Way without Causing It to Happen<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophical Studies<\/em> 129 (2006). I offer conditions under which causing an outcome to happen in a certain way is not sufficient for causing the outcome. The principle works as an argument against the transitivity of causation.<\/p>\n

A New Asymmetry Between Actions and Omissions<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

No\u00fbs<\/em> 39 (2005). I argue that there is a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions, which has its source in a causal asymmetry.<\/p>\n

Causes As Difference Makers<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophical Studies<\/em> 123 (2005). I defend a principle according to which causes are difference-makers with respect to their effects.<\/p>\n

How To Be Responsible for Something Without Causing It<\/strong><\/h5>\n

(pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Philosophical Perspectives<\/em> 18 (2004). I argue that being morally responsible doesn\u2019t entail being a cause, and I offer an alternative way of understanding the relationship between responsibility and causation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Grounds of Our Freedom (pdf) Inquiry\u00a0(2022, symposium on Frankfurt’s alternative possibilities paper). I discuss the relation between freedom and grounding, especially in connection with views inspired by Frankfurt’s paper. … Read More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"template-custom.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-363","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPapers - Carolina Sartorio<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Papers - Carolina Sartorio\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The Grounds of Our Freedom (pdf) Inquiry\u00a0(2022, symposium on Frankfurt’s alternative possibilities paper). I discuss the relation between freedom and grounding, especially in connection with views inspired by Frankfurt’s paper. … Read More\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Carolina Sartorio\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2022-11-17T20:02:23+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"7 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/\",\"name\":\"Papers - Carolina Sartorio\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2020-07-09T16:51:59+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-11-17T20:02:23+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Papers\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/\",\"name\":\"Carolina Sartorio\",\"description\":\"\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Papers - Carolina Sartorio","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Papers - Carolina Sartorio","og_description":"The Grounds of Our Freedom (pdf) Inquiry\u00a0(2022, symposium on Frankfurt’s alternative possibilities paper). I discuss the relation between freedom and grounding, especially in connection with views inspired by Frankfurt’s paper. … Read More","og_url":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/","og_site_name":"Carolina Sartorio","article_modified_time":"2022-11-17T20:02:23+00:00","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Est. reading time":"7 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/","url":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/","name":"Papers - Carolina Sartorio","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/#website"},"datePublished":"2020-07-09T16:51:59+00:00","dateModified":"2022-11-17T20:02:23+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/publications\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Papers"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/#website","url":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/","name":"Carolina Sartorio","description":"","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/363"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/21"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=363"}],"version-history":[{"count":44,"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/363\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":559,"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/363\/revisions\/559"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.rutgers.edu\/carolina-sartorio\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=363"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}