

in the rotation of the seasons, the very same signs of the different seasons are seen repeated, so also at the beginning of a cycle the various things are created as in the previous cycle' (Vi. I. v. 65).

Topic 8 : The rights of the gods to practise certain Upāsanās

मध्वादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ॥ ३० ॥

30. Jaimini (is of the opinion) that the gods (Vasu and others) are not entitled for Madhu-vidyā etc. on account of the impossibility.

It has been shown that the gods are qualified for the meditation on Brahman. Now the question is raised whether they are qualified for certain other upāsanās. In many of the meditations (upāsanās) one has to meditate on the self of some god or other. For example, in Madhu-vidyā one has to meditate on the sun-god. Such a meditation would be impossible for the sun-god. So the gods cannot practise these meditations for the same person cannot be both the object of meditation and the meditator. Moreover, the result of such meditations is the attainment of the position of such gods which they are already and there is no question of their attaining it. So Jaimini thinks the gods are not qualified for Madhu-vidyā etc.

ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ॥ ३१ ॥

31. And on account of (the meditation of the gods) being on the Light (of lights i.e. Brahman).

'The gods meditate on that Light of lights as life and

immortality' (Br. IV. iv. 16). Though this meditation is common to both men and the gods, yet the special mention of the gods shows that they have a right only for this meditation and not for other meditations like Madhu-vidyā etc.

भावं तु बादरायणः, अस्ति हि ॥ ३२ ॥

32. But Bādarāyaṇa (maintains) the existence (of these qualifications) for it is possible.

Bādarāyaṇa maintains that the gods have necessary qualifications for Madhu-vidyā etc. for it is possible for them to meditate upon Brahman in their own form and attain also its results, viz the position of Vasu (the sun-god) etc. in the next cycle also.

Topic 9 : The right of the Sūdras for Brahmanavidyā discussed

शुगस्य तदनादरणश्रवणात्, तदाद्रवणात् सूच्यते हि ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Grief arose in him (Jānaśruti) on hearing the contemptuous words (of the Ṛṣi in the form of the flamingo); owing to his approaching him (Raikva with) that (grief) (Raikva called him a Sūdra); because it (the grief) is referred to (by Raikva).

In the last topic it has been shown that the gods are entitled to Brahma-vidyā. This topic discusses whether the Sūdras are entitled to it. Since like the gods, the Sūdras also are possessed of a body, capacity and desire for final liberation, it naturally follows that they too are entitled to Brahmanavidyā. Maybe they are debarred from the Vedic

studies, yet as *Upāsanās* consist only of mental activity the Śūdras have the necessary qualifications for that and they can get the necessary knowledge about the nature of Brahman and the methods of meditation from *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas* for which they have a right though not for Vedic studies. We also hear of Śūdras like Vidura who were established in the knowledge of Brahman. In the *Upaniṣads* we have instances where *Brahmavidyā* has been imparted to Śūdras. In the *Saṁvargavidyā* (*Chā. IV*) we find that there was a great king called Jānaśruti who was famous for his good works. In order to create a desire in him for the knowledge of Brahman two Ṛṣis took the form of swans and approached the place where Jānaśruti was sitting. One of them praised the king while the other spoke contemptuously of him as he did not have the knowledge of Brahman like Raikva whom he praised. The king on hearing this was smitten with grief for not having this knowledge of Brahman and so approached Raikva with presents for getting this knowledge from him. This sage Raikva addressed him twice as 'Śūdra'. Raikva said, 'O Śūdra, you have brought all these presents! Even by this means you will make me talk' (*Chā. IV. ii. 5*). After addressing the king thus, Raikva taught him Brahman.

This *Sūtra* refutes this view and denies to Śūdras by caste, the right to *Brahmavidyā*. Though meditation is only a mental activity yet the intellectual knowledge required as a means to the *Upāsanā* is not possible without the study of the *Vedas*, as in the case of ritualistic action. As Śūdras are barred from Vedic studies they cannot therefore have the necessary qualifications for such *Upāsanās*. *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* only reiterate the knowledge derived from the Vedic studies and so, there is no

chance of the Śūdra getting this knowledge from them, without the necessary background from the study of the *Vedas*. Vidura and others had this knowledge on account of *saṁskāras* of a previous life. Moreover, that Jānaśruti was addressed by Raikva as 'Śūdra' is not because he belonged to that caste by birth; it refers to his grief for not having the knowledge of Brahman, for 'Śūdra' etymologically means 'one who grieves'. So Śūdras by caste are not entitled to *Brahmavidyā*.

क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्च ॥ ३४ ॥

34. And because his (Jānaśruti's) Kṣatriyahood is known (from the texts).

The *Chāndogya* texts at the beginning of Chapter IV tell us that Jānaśruti had given gifts liberally and plenty of food too in charity. He also gave many villages to the sage Raikva as teacher's fee. All this shows that he was a man of position, a Kṣatriya, and not a low-born Śūdra.

उत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गित् ॥ ३५ ॥

35. On account of the indicatory sign later on (of his being mentioned) along with a descendant of Citraratha (a Kṣatriya) (Jānaśruti's Kṣatriyahood is known).

In connection with the same *Vidyā* later on, Jānaśruti is mentioned with Caitraratha Abhipratārin who was a Kṣatriya. So the inference is that Jānaśruti is also a Kṣatriya as equals alone are mentioned together. Regarding this *Vidyā* it is said later that it should be resorted to by Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas only.

संस्कारपरामर्शत्, तदभावाभिलापाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Because purificatory ceremonies are mentioned (before the study of the Vedas) and their absence declared (in the case of the Śūdras).

In the scriptures we find purificatory ceremonies like Upanayana etc. prescribed as prerequisites to the study of the Vedas and the vidyās. *Vide Chā. IV. iv. 5.* These ceremonies are for the three higher castes and not for the Śūdra. Their absence in the case of the Śūdra is repeatedly declared in the scriptures. 'Śūdras do not incur sin, nor have they any purificatory rites' (*Manu XIII. 126*); 'The fourth caste is once born and not fit for any ceremony' (*Manu X. 4*). So they are not entitled to the study of the Vedas or to the vidyās.

तदभावाभिधाने च प्रवृत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

37. And because the inclination (on the part of Gautama to impart knowledge is seen only) on the ascertainment of the absence of that (Śūdrahood) (in Jābāla Satyakāma).

In *Chāndogya IV. iv. 5* we have, 'The teacher said to him : No one who is not a Brāhmaṇa can speak thus. Dear boy, bring the sacrificial fuel, I shall initiate you as a Brahmacārin, for you have not deviated from truth.' It was only after Gautama was convinced that Satyakāma, though the son of a maid servant, yet was not a Śūdra but a Brāhmaṇa that he proceeded to impart knowledge to Satyakāma. Hence Śūdras do not have the necessary qualification for Brahman-vidyā and so are not entitled to it.

श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात् ॥ ३८ ॥

38. (And) because of the prohibition of hearing and studying (the Vedas) and knowing their meaning (and performing Vedic rites) (to Śūdras, they are not entitled to Upāsana).

Śūdras are debarred from hearing and studying the Vedas. 'Therefore the Vedas must not be studied in the presence of Śūdras'. When they are not entitled even to hear the Vedas the question of their studying them and performing rites prescribed by them does not arise at all.

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ३९ ॥

39. And on account of Smṛti texts (which prohibit hearing and studying of the Vedas by Śūdras).

Smṛtis also prohibit imparting Vedic knowledge to Śūdras. 'He is not to teach him (a Śūdra) sacred duties or vows' (*Manu IV. 80*).

*The Prāṇa in which everything trembles is Brahman

Having concluded the intervening topics about the right of the gods and the Śūdras for Brahman-vidyā, the main subject is again taken up and a further reason is given to show that the Person of the size of a thumb is the supreme Brahman.

* These two Sūtras, 40 and 41, form a part of topic 6 and hence no separate number is given.

कम्पनात् ॥ ४० ॥

40. On account of trembling (of the whole world in His breath, He is Brahman).

In between *Kāṭha* II. iv. 12 and II. vi. 17 dealing with the Person of the size of a thumb we have the following text, 'Whatever there is in the whole world, when it comes out of Him, trembles in His breath. He is a great terror like the raised thunderbolt. Those who know this become immortal. For fear of Him the fire burns ; for fear of Him the sun shines' etc. (*Ka.* II. vi. 2-3). This text tells us that the whole world including fire, sun, Indra and others trembles from great fear of Him who is of the size of a thumb and who is referred to in the above text as *Prāṇa*. Here we have an attribute of Brahman, for such power before which everything trembles belongs to Brahman only, as could be gathered from other texts also. 'From fear of It the wind blows, from fear the sun rises' etc. (*Tai.* II. viii. 1). *Vide* also *Bṛ.* III. viii. 9.

ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ॥ ४१ ॥

41. On account of brilliance declared in the text.

A further reason is given in this *Sūtra* to show that the Person of the size of a thumb is Brahman. 'The sun does not shine, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings and much less this fire. He shining, everything shines after Him. By His light all this is lighted' (*Ka.* II. v. 15). This supreme brilliance is a quality of Brahman as we find from *Mu.* II. ii. 10 where this very text is read. Moreover, other *Śruti* texts also declare the supreme Person as light. 'The

gods meditate on that Light of lights as longevity' etc. (*Bṛ.* IV. iv. 16); 'Now that Light which shines above this heaven' (*Chā.* III. xiii. 7). Therefore the Person of the size of a thumb is Brahman.

Topic 10 : The *Ākāśa* which reveals names and forms is Brahman

आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४२ ॥

42. *Ākāśa* (is Brahman) because it is declared to be something different etc. (from names and forms and yet their revealer).

'That which is called *Ākāśa* is the revealer of the names and forms. That within which these names and forms are, is Brahman, the immortal, the Self' (*Chā.* VIII. xiv. 1). A doubt arises whether the *Ākāśa* is the released individual soul spoken of in *Chā.* VIII. xiii. 1 or Brahman. It may be asked : As the small *Ākāśa* has been shown to be Brahman, how can such a doubt arise as to the meaning of the word *Ākāśa* in this text ? The doubt arises because between the section dealing with small *Ākāśa* and this text there intervenes the teaching of *Prajāpati* which deals with the individual soul in all its conditions. The immediately previous text deals with the individual soul in the state of release. 'Shaking off evil as a horse his hairs, shaking off the body as the moon frees itself from the mouth of *Rāhu*, I, having fulfilled all ends obtain the eternal Brahman-world' (*Chā.* VIII. xiii. 1). So the opponent holds that it is the liberated individual soul that is referred to as *Ākāśa*. In its conditioned state the individual soul can be said to be the revealer of names and forms, for it supports in its unreleased condition

the shape of gods etc. and their names, and in the released state it is beyond all names and forms.

This *Sūtra* refutes this view and says that it is the supreme Brahman that is referred to by the word 'Ākāśa'. The evolver of names and forms does not mean one who takes those forms, the individual soul, but one who evolves these names and forms for it. This is possible only for the supreme Brahman. Even the released soul does not possess this quality. vide *B.S. IV. iv. 17*. On the other hand we find from the scriptures that Brahman alone reveals these names and forms. 'Entering within these three deities with this living self, let Me evolve names and forms' (*Chā VI. iii. 2*). *Vide also Mu. I. i. 9*. So this Ākāśa is different from the individual soul in both its states viz the state of bondage and the state of release. In the state of bondage it is subject to name and form and so cannot be their revealer, and in its state of release it has no connection with the world (*B.S. IV. iv. 17*). 'Etc.' includes immortality and other qualities mentioned in the text. So Ākāśa is Brahman which in the previous text, *Chā. VIII. xiii. 1* is referred to as the Brahman-world to be attained, and the attainer, the released soul, is obviously different from it.

सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्तयोर्भेदेन ॥ ४३ ॥

43. On account of difference being shown in deep sleep and death (between the individual soul and Brahman).

A further objection is raised by the opponent. Scriptural texts like, 'That thou art' (*tat tvam asi*), 'There is no difference whatsoever here' (*neha nānāsti kiṃcana*) declare the unity of all selves and deny duality. Hence the individual soul is non-different from Brahman. Texts like, 'the highest

Brahman' etc. refer only to the individual soul in release; and the attainer, the soul, and the attained, the Brahman-world, are not different. Therefore, the word 'Ākāśa' refers to the individual soul in release.

This *Sūtra* refutes this objection. This person (individual self) 'embraced by the supremely intelligent Self knows nothing that is without or within' etc. (*Br. IV. iii. 21*). This shows that in deep sleep state the individual soul is different from the supremely intelligent Self, viz Brahman. So also at the time of death. 'The self that is in the body presided over by the supremely intelligent Self departs' etc. (*Br. IV. iii. 35*). Thus in deep sleep state and at the time of death, the individual soul bereft of the knowledge of the external and internal things is shown to be different from the supremely intelligent Self which is all-knowing. This clearly shows that the supreme Self is different from the individual soul.

पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ॥ ४४ ॥

44. On account of the words like 'Lord' etc. (it is the supreme Self).

Epithets like Lord, Ruler etc. are applied to this embracing Self. *Vide Br. IV. iv. 22*. Again, 'This infinite, birthless self is the eater of all foods, and the bestower of the results of work—undecaying, immortal, fearless' etc. (*Br. IV. iv. 24-25*). All these qualities mentioned in these texts cannot be true of the Jiva even in the state of release. So the Ākāśa which is the revealer of names and forms is different from the released individual soul. The declaration of unity means only that all sentient and insentient things being effects of Brahman, have It for their inner Self. 'All this is Brahman' means this. This will be explained further in *B. S. I. iv. 22*.

CHAPTER I

SECTION IV

In the first Section Brahman, the object of inquiry by those longing for Liberation, was defined as the first Cause. It was then shown that this definition refers only to Brahman which is different from the sentient and insentient world and thereby the rest like Pradhāna etc. were excluded from the category of being the first Cause. After that in the three Sections, the possibility of anything else than Brahman being the first Cause was taken up for discussion. In Section two, Causal texts of doubtful import referring to animate and inanimate beings rather indistinctly, and in Section three such Causal texts more or less clearly referring to sentient and insentient things as the first Cause, were taken up for discussion, and it was shown that all these texts refer to Brahman only and not to other things. In the present Section very clear references in Causal texts to other things as the first Cause is being taken up for discussion and refutation.

In certain scriptural texts the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas seems to be mentioned as the first Cause. This Section refutes such a view and confirms that Brahman is the ultimate Cause of everything.

In the last topic of the previous Section it was shown that Brahman is different from the individual soul whether in the state of bondage or freedom. The objection that there is nothing like Brahman different from the individual soul was refuted. The present topic is begun to refute a similar

objection raised from a different standpoint. It also refutes the view that the Pradhāna is the first Cause.

Topic 1 : The Mahat and the Avyakta of the Katha Upaniṣad do not refer to Sāṃkhyan categories

आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेत्, न, शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेः,
दर्शयति च ॥ १ ॥

1. If it be said that in some (versions of the Vedas) that which is inferred (i.e. the Pradhāna) (is) also (mentioned as the first Cause) (we say) no, because (the word 'Unevolved'—Avyakta—in the Katha text) is mentioned in a simile referring to the body (and means the body itself); (the text) too explains (it).

In the Katha Upaniṣad we have, 'Beyond the Great (Mahat) there is the Unevolved (Avyakta), beyond the Unevolved is the Being (Puruṣa). Beyond the Being there is nothing, that is the end, that is the supreme goal' (I. iii. 11). Does the word 'Unevolved' (Avyakta) here refer to the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna or not—this is the doubt that arises here. The opponent holds that it refers to the Pradhāna; for the principles, the Great (Mahat), the Unevolved (Avyakta) and Puruṣa are identified to be the Sāṃkhyan categories inasmuch as they are mentioned in the text in the order enumerated in the Sāṃkhyan Philosophy. This is further confirmed by the text when it says that beyond the Being (Puruṣa) there is nothing, thereby denying the existence of anything beyond the Puruṣa, the twenty-fifth category of the Sāṃkhyas. So the 'Unevolved', the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna, is the first Cause.

The second half of the Sūtra refutes this view and says

that by the word 'Unevolved' (Avyakta) the Pradhāna independent of Brahman is not referred to but the body represented as the chariot in the simile of the body in a previous text. 'Know that the soul is the rider of the chariot and the body as the chariot' etc. (Ka. I. iii. 3). This text mentions in the form of a simile the various means of meditation as the chariot-rider, chariot etc. in order to teach their control. From the standpoint of control which one is superior to which is described in, 'The objects are superior to the senses' etc. (Ka. I. iii. 10-11). Now all the things mentioned in Ka. I. iii. 3-4 are found in Ka. I. iii. 10-11, being designated by their proper names. Only the word 'chariot' in the earlier text and Avyakta in the later text remain. So we have to understand that what is described as the chariot, viz the body in the earlier text, is denoted here in the later text, by the word 'Unevolved' (Avyakta). Hence there is not the least trace of any reference to the Sāṃkhyan principle in these texts. The text under discussion refers only to those entities mentioned previously in the simile. In 'Higher than the Unevolved is the Being (Puruṣa)', the word Puruṣa (Being) does not refer to the twenty-fifth category of the Sāṃkhyan but to the supreme Brahman that is to be attained by meditation and self-control prescribed in these texts.

सूक्ष्मं तु तदहत्त्वात् ॥ २ ॥

2. But the subtle (cause of the body is meant by the 'Unevolved' Avyakta) on account of its capacity (to attain the end of man).

As the body is gross how can it be described as 'Unevolved' (Avyakta)? In reply it is said that the fine

uncompounded elements under particular conditions become the body. These elements in their fine state are what is called the 'Unevolved' and these later on evolve into the gross body. It is the 'Unevolved' *as the body* that is called the Unevolved (Avyakta). The 'Unevolved' insentient matter, when it assumes gross states and forms, serves the ends of man. It may be said that if the 'Unevolved' is taken here as subtle matter why not accept the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna, as it also means the same thing? The next *Sūtra* answers it.

तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ॥ ३ ॥

3. (Matter in the subtle state) serves an end (of man), on account of its dependence on Him (the Lord).

The Lord is the cause of everything and the subtle matter subserves an end in so far as it is dependent on Him. Subtle matter is not denied by the scriptures but its existence as independent of the Lord is denied. It constitutes His body and He is its Self. It is only on account of this relation between the two that the Pradhāna is capable of accomplishing ends. The Sāṃkhyas do not accept this dependence and that is why their view is refuted in this topic. Everywhere in the scriptures where the creation of the world or the greatness of the Lord is described, the Pradhāna and individual souls are declared to be His body and to have their Self in the Lord. *Vide Sū. 2 & 3 ; Gītā, III. 3-7.*

ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

4. And because it is not mentioned (that the 'Unevolved') is to be known (it cannot be the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas).

If the Pradhāna was meant, then the text would have declared it as a thing to be known, for according to Sāṃkhya's final Liberation results when the difference between the Puruṣa and the Unevolved (Prakṛti) is known. So the 'Unevolved' with them is to be known. But the text does not declare that the 'Unevolved' is to be known and so it cannot be the Pradhāna.

वदतीति चेत्, न, प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

5. If it be said (that the Śruti) does state (that the 'Unevolved' has to be known and therefore it is the Pradhāna); (we say) no, for (it is) the intelligent (supreme) Self (which is meant), since this is the topic.

'He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch...beyond the Great (mahat) and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. I. iii. 15). The Sāṃkhya's hold that in this text the Śruti says that the Pradhāna has to be known to attain Liberation. This Sūtra refutes this view and says that what the text declares as the object of meditation is not the 'Unevolved' (avyakta) but the intelligent (supreme) Self as that is the subject-matter of that Section, which is inferred from the two previous texts—'He who has intelligence for his charioteer' etc. (Ka. I. iii. 9); 'That Self hidden in all beings' etc. (Ka. I. iii. 12). For the same reason, 'Higher than the Puruṣa there is nothing' does not refer to the Sāṃkhyan Puruṣa but to the supreme Lord. That the supreme Lord is without sound etc. is declared by Mu. I. i. 6. 'And beyond the Great' (Ka. I. ii. 11) declares the Lord as beyond the individual soul called the 'Great' in the previous text (Ka. I. iii. 10).

त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च ॥ ६ ॥

6. And of the three only there is this mention and question.

In the text under discussion there is the mention of three things only as objects knowledge viz the object of the meditation, the nature of the meditation and the person meditating, and questions are only with reference to those three. There is no mention of, or question relating to, the Pradhāna. In the third boon Naciketa inquires about the final Liberation and this inquiry includes the nature of the goal or object to be realized, the means to it and the nature of the person wishing for it. Yama replies, 'They know the ancient effulgent One through knowledge of the Self obtained by concentration'—this is the elucidation of the question, 'When a man departs from here there is this doubt : Some say "He exists". Some again, "He does not" etc.' (Ka. I. i. 20). So there are references and questions only with regard to these three and therefore the 'Unevolved' cannot be the Pradhāna.

महद्वच्च ॥ ७ ॥

7. And like the Great (Mahat) (the word 'Unevolved'—Avyakta—does not refer to the Sāṃkhyan category).

In the text, 'Higher than the intelligent is the great Self', as the word great is co-ordinated with the word Self, it was shown that it does not refer to the Sāṃkhyan category, the 'Great' (Mahat). So the word 'Unevolved' which is said to be higher than the great Self cannot mean Pradhāna but the supreme Lord.

Topic 2 : The Tri-coloured Ajā of the Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad is not the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna

चमसवदविशेषात् ॥ ८ ॥

8. (The word 'Ajā' cannot be asserted to mean the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna) in the absence of special characteristics, as in the case of the bowl.

This Sūtra refutes the Sāṃkhyan view which declares Prakṛti, Mahat, Ego etc. independent of Brahman. It does not, however, refute these categories themselves as dependent on the supreme Brahman, and having Brahman for their Self. For this latter view, as having their Self in Brahman, is taught by Śruti and Smṛti.

In the Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad we have the following text : 'There is one Ajā (female unborn), red, white and black, producing manifold offspring of the same hue' (IV. 5). The question is whether this 'Ajā' refers to the Sāṃkhyan Prakṛti or to a Prakṛti dependent on Brahman, and having its Self in Brahman. The Sāṃkhyas hold that this word 'Ajā' refers to the Pradhāna, and the red, white and black colours refer to its three constituents, the Guṇas, Rajas, Sattva and Tamas respectively. Moreover, it is described as 'unborn' and is spoken of as the independent cause of many products. This Sūtra refutes this view and says that the word 'Ajā' cannot refer to the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna in the absence of special characteristics to support such an assertion. Merely saying 'unborn' is not enough to identify it with the Sāṃkhyan category, the Pradhāna. The text may be interpreted otherwise also as referring to a Prakṛti dependent on Brahman. It can also be the cause of many offspring even though dependent on Brahman. The text

says only that it is the cause and not that it is the independent cause. It is impossible to fix the meaning of the word 'Ajā' from the text alone. Mere derivative meaning of a word cannot fix the nature of a word in scriptural texts. We have to look to complementary passages to arrive at the correct meaning. 'There is a bowl that has its opening below and bulging at the top' (Br. II. ii. 3). Here also it is impossible to decide from the text itself what kind of a bowl is meant. Later the text fixes what is meant by the 'bowl'. 'The "bowl with its opening below and bulging above" is the head (of ours), for it is a bowl with its opening below and bulging above.' So here also in the text under discussion we have to refer to complementary scriptural texts to know the exact meaning of the word 'Ajā'.

Moreover, another recension of the text declares that it is dependent on Brahman.

ज्योतिरूपक्रमा तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके ॥ ९ ॥

9. (Prakṛti) has Light for its origin, so read some (recensions).

The 'Ajā' (unborn) mentioned in the text has Brahman for its origin. So read some, viz the Taittirīyas. Even as this text declares the 'Ajā', so also the Taittirīyas declare in a similar text that this 'Ajā' is dependent on Brahman and has Brahman for its Self. Having taught the Brahman as the object of meditation in the text, 'Smaller than the small, geater than the great' etc. (Ma. XII. 1), the Śruti declares finally that all other things are produced from Brahman and have Brahman for their Self. 'From Him

originate the seven Prāṇas . . . From Him arise all the seas and mountains' (*Ma.* XII. 2-3). In this context, the text (*Ma.* XII. 5) reads also the above verse of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 'There is one Ajā (unborn)' etc. So from the *Taittirīya* text it is clear that the 'Ajā' also is produced from Brahman and has Brahman for its Self. So the *Śvetāśvatara* text has to be interpreted in the light of the above *Taittirīya* text as explained by the complementary passage. So the 'Ajā' in the *Śvetāśvatara* text also has Brahman for its Self. It is not an independent entity and therefore cannot mean the Sāṃkhyan Pradhāna.

It may be questioned : How can the same thing be declared as 'unborn' and also as originating from Brahman ? The next *Sūtra* answers this doubt.

कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिबदविरोधः ॥ १० ॥

10. And on account of the teaching of creation (*Kalpanā*) there is no contradiction as in the case of the *Madhuvidyā*.

The word 'And' disposes of a doubt that is raised. 'Kalpanā' means creation for this is the meaning we get from *Ma.* where it is said, 'The Lord created (*akalpayat*) the sun and the moon as of yore.' The creation of Prakṛti is taught in the text, 'The Lord of Māyā creates the whole world out of *this*' (*Śve.* IV. 9), where the word 'this' refers to Prakṛti. At the time of pralaya or dissolution, this Prakṛti in the causal state exists in a fine condition as the power of the Lord and dependent on Him. Referring to that state, Prakṛti is called 'Ajā' (unborn). But at the time of creation it takes a gross form and is said to be caused by Brahman.

Topic 3 : The fivefold five people of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV.
iv. 17 are not the twenty-five Sāṃkhyan categories

In the last topic the interpretation of the word 'Ajā' as an independent entity, not having its Self in Brahman, was set aside as there were no special characteristics to interpret it as such, and it was shown that Prakṛti is dependent on Brahman. Now another text is taken up for discussion where the special characteristic is mentioned unlike in the previous topic.

न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

11. Even from the statement of the number (fivefold five, i.e. twenty-five categories by the Śruti, it is) not (to be presumed that the Śruti refers to the Pradhāna) on account of the difference and the excess (over the number of the Sāṃkhyan categories).

'That in which the five groups of five and the Ākāśa are placed, that very Self I hold is the immortal Brahman. Knowing It I am immortal' (*Bṛ.* IV. iv. 17). The question is raised whether the 'fivefold five' mentioned in the text refers to Sāṃkhyan twenty-five categories or not. The Sāṃkhyan hold that this text refers to their twenty-five categories. The *Sūtra* refutes this view. These fivefold five objects referred to in the text are different from the Sāṃkhyan categories. The word 'even' in the *Sūtra* denotes that the number twenty-five is not meant here. The Sāṃkhyan twenty-five categories cannot be grouped into five groups for each one is different from the other, and no five can be grouped in one for want of a common property. The text 'That in which . . . are placed' distinguishes the 'that'

which is the receptacle from the twenty-five categories placed in It, and which is therefore their Self. There is therefore no reference to Sāṃkhyan categories independent of Brahman in the text. The words 'That' and 'Ākāśa' refer to objects different from the twenty-five categories and therefore are over and above them. This does not fit in with the Sāṃkhyan categories. 'Pañcājana' therefore denotes a class of things known by that word. This is similar to the statement 'seven, seven sages'.

प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १२ ॥

12. (The five people referred to are) the breath etc. because of the complementary passage.

'They who know the breath of the breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food, the mind of the mind' etc. (*Br. Mādhyandina* IV. iv. 21). 'The five people' refer to the breath etc. which are cited to describe Brahman and have their Self in It.

ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने ॥ १३ ॥

13. (In the text) of some (i.e. the Kāṇvas), food not being mentioned (the number is made up) by Light (mentioned in the previous verse).

In the Kāṇva recension we do not have 'the food of the food', but all the same the number five is made up by the word 'lights' mentioned in 'The Light of the lights' (*Br.* IV. iv. 16). Here the word 'lights' refers to the sense organs. 'Light of lights' means Brahman who is the Illuminator of illuminators or the sense organs. Hence the word 'Pañcājana' refers to the five sense organs.

Therefore the fivefold five' in the text under discussion does not refer to the Sāṃkhyan categories.

Topic 4 : There is no contradiction in the scriptures as regards the fact that Brahman is the first Cause

In the last section it was shown that the sense organs, Ākāśa etc. are dependent on Brahman and have their Self in Brahman, and thereby it was shown that the Pradhāna independent of Brahman cannot be the Cause of the world spoken of in the Śruti texts. Now it will be shown that all the Vedānta texts describing the Cause refer to Brahman alone and not to the Pradhāna at all, as that Cause.

कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथा व्यपदिष्टोक्तः ॥ १४ ॥

14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the cause of ether (Ākāśa) etc.

The Sāṃkhyas again try to show that the causal texts do not refer to one particular single cause. In the Śruti texts no particular single agent is declared to be the Cause of this world and therefore Brahman cannot be the sole first Cause. 'In the beginning, dear boy, this was Being alone, one only without a second' (*Chā.* VI. ii. 1) here Being is said to be the first Cause. In another place the text says, 'In the beginning this was indeed Non-being' (*Tai.* II. vii. 1); 'Before creation, this was Non-being. Then it became Being' (*Chā.* III. xix. 1). Since the texts mention different agents as the first Cause, it is not possible to say that they declare that Brahman alone is that first Cause. But on the other hand it is possible to infer that the Pradhāna is the first Cause. 'This then was Unmanifest' (*Br.* I. iv. 7), shows that before creation the universe existed in

the Pradhāna in its unevolved condition and then 'It manifested itself as names and forms' (*Br.* I. iv. 7), which shows that the creation proceeds from the 'Unmanifest', i.e. that which is not distinguished by name and form. The 'Unmanifest' is none other than the Pradhāna. As this is eternal in its essential nature and the basis of all change, it produces the world of name and form. It can therefore be said to be both Being and Non-being. But Brahman cannot be said to be both without contradiction. So the texts like, 'It thought, may I be many' etc. have also to be appropriately interpreted to refer to the Pradhāna, as meaning the state immediate before the evolution sets in. The terms, 'Self' and 'Brahman' are also to be interpreted as referring to the Pradhāna which is all-pervading and eminently great. Therefore the Pradhāna alone is the first Cause.

This *Sūtra* refutes this view. The word 'and' is used in the sense of 'but'. It is possible to declare from the *Śruti* texts that Brahman who is all-knowing, Lord of all etc. alone is the sole Cause of this world. Brahman as described is said to be the Cause of ether etc. As described means : '(Brahman is that omnipotent, omniscient Cause) from which proceed the origin etc. (i.e. sustenance and dissolution) of this (world)' (*B. S.* I. i. 2). Brahman is introduced as the subject matter in the text, 'Brahman is Existence, Intelligence, Infinitude' (*Tai.* II. 1) and then the text says, 'From that very Self ether sprang' where 'from that' refers to the Brahman mentioned earlier. Similarly in the text, 'It sent forth fire' (*Chā.* VI. ii. 3) the word 'It' refers to Brahman mentioned earlier in that text, 'It thought, may I be many' (*Chā.* VI. ii. 3). All accounts of creation therefore confirm the view that Brahman is the sole Cause of this world.

If that be so, how can the texts describe It as Non-being? The next *Sūtra* explains it.

समाकर्षति ॥ १५ ॥

15. On account of the connection (with the passages referring to Brahman, Non-being does not mean absolute Non-being).

'In the beginning this was indeed Non-being', here also the Non-being refers to Brahman alone. The section previous to this text says, 'Different from this Self consisting of Understanding is the Self consisting of Bliss' (*Tai.* II. 5); 'He, the Self desired, May I become many. . . He projected all this, whatever there is here. Having brought it forth, verily, He entered into it' etc. (*Tai.* II. 6). This latter text refers clearly to the Brahman consisting of Bliss referred to in the previous text. Further *Tai.* II. 6 says 'On this there is this verse' and declares in *Tai.* II. 7, 'In the beginning this was indeed Non-being' etc. It is clear that *Tai.* II. 7 explains what is said in the previous section. Moreover, we have the text, 'Out of fear of Him the wind blows' etc. (*Tai.* II. 8) which refers to Brahman.

In the state of dissolution when there is no distinction of name and form, Brahman not being connected with them is said to be Non-being. The text, 'This then was Unmanifest' (*Br.* I. iv. 7) does not refer to the Pradhāna but to Brahman whose body is not yet evolved into gross form. 'That same Being has penetrated into all these bodies up to the nail ends' (*Br.* I. iv. 7), here the words, 'That same Being' refer to the 'Unmanifest' mentioned earlier and It is said to enter all beings and that It thereby becomes their ruler. *Chā.* VI. iii. 2 also says that Brahman enters into

creation. It enters into creation and becomes its ruler which is not possible for the insentient Pradhāna. The 'Unmanifest' therefore is Brahman when Its body is not developed into gross form but exists in a fine state. 'It developed Itself as names and forms' (Br. I. iv. 7), i.e. It evolved Its body into the gross form with the distinction of names and forms. In this interpretation the words 'It thought' etc. can be interpreted in their primary meaning. Therefore Brahman is the sole Cause.

Topic 5 : He who is the maker of this world is Brahman and not Prāṇa (vital force) or the individual soul

So far in the previous topics it has been shown that some sentient Being is the cause of this world. The Sāṅkhyas again raise the objection : Granted this conclusion of the previous topics, yet that sentient Being can be only the individual self and the insentient Pradhāna presided over by the individual self is only what is taught as the first Cause and no other entity besides this is taught by the scriptures.

जगद्वाचित्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

16. (He whose work this is, is Brahman) because (the work) denotes the world.

'He, O Bālāki, who is the maker of these persons (whom you mentioned), and whose work this is—is alone to be known' (Kau. IV. 19). In this section Bālāki first describes the several individual souls residing in the sun, moon, ether, etc. as Brahman. Ajātaśatru says that these are not Brahman and proceeding to teach the real Brahman, says, 'He who is the maker of these persons is alone to be known and

not these persons'. Here who is the maker of the sun, moon, etc. is the question. The Sāṅkhyas say that it is the individual soul for the clause 'whose work this is' connects this Being to be known with work and as the individual soul alone is connected with work, its merits and demerits, the Brahman spoken of is none other than the individual soul. Neither can it be said that 'work' here stands for the world which is perceived by the senses, for in that case the two separate clauses, 'who is the maker of these persons' and 'whose work this is' would be redundant as the latter statement includes the former one. Moreover, the meaning of the word 'work' both in scriptures and in ordinary parlance is meritorious and demeritorious actions. So the Being to be known is the individual soul as separated from Prakṛti.

This view is refuted by the Sūtra which says that the word 'work' here denotes the world and so the Being to be known is not the individual soul subject to good and evil works and which through ignorance gets mixed up with Prakṛti and thinks is the cause of the effects of Prakṛti, but the supreme Brahman. The word 'work' here denotes, as can be gathered from the context, the entire universe made of sentient and insentient beings. If it were the individual soul then Bālāki already knew these souls residing in the sun, moon, etc. and so nothing new is taught by Ajātaśatru. So the word 'work' must be interpreted to mean some Being not known to Bālāki. Therefore the text means : He who is the maker of these persons whom you wrongly thought to be Brahman, of which Being these persons are creatures, of whom this entire world of sentient and insentient beings is the effect, is to be known. This Being can be only the supreme Brahman which is the first Cause according to all Vedānta texts.

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्, तद्व्याख्यातम् ॥ १७ ॥

17. If it be said that on account of the characteristics of the individual soul and the chief Prāṇa (found in the text) (Brahman) is not (referred to), (we reply) that has already been explained.

'Then he becomes one with this Prāṇa alone' and 'Thus does the conscious self feed with the other selves' (*Kau.* IV. 20)—in these texts the vital breath and the individual soul are clearly mentioned. So the opponent holds that it must be one of these two that is referred to as the Being to be known.

This *Sūtra* refutes this view and says that it has already been explained in *B.S.* I. i. 29-32. There it was shown that if a topic clearly refers at the beginning and at the end to Brahman then the intervening texts have to be interpreted as referring to Brahman and consequently characteristics of the individual soul and Prāṇa mentioned there were explained as connected with a threefold meditation on Brahman. Here also the topic begins with the words, 'Shall I tell you Brahman' (*Kau.* IV. 1), in the middle we have the text, 'whose work this is' which refers to Brahman, and the topic ends by saying, 'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy' (*Kau.* IV. 20), and this fruit is possible only if it is the knowledge of the supreme Brahman. So in the beginning, the middle and the end, the topic refers to Brahman. It is the main subject-matter of the topic and so all references to Prāṇa and the individual soul should be so interpreted as to be connected with Brahman ultimately. 'Then he becomes one with this Prāṇa alone'—in this text 'this' and 'Prāṇa' are co-ordinated and so Prāṇa is used here to refer

to Brahman. We have to interpret that the Brahman which has the Prāṇa for Its body is prescribed here for meditation. Similarly the reference to the individual soul should be connected with Brahman the main topic. This is explained in the next *Sūtra*.

अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके ॥ १८ ॥

18. But Jaimini (thinks that the reference to the individual soul in the text) has another purpose because of the question and answer; moreover thus some (the Vājasaneyins) (read in their recension).

'And the two together came to a person who was asleep' etc. (*Kau.* IV. 19), here by striking the sleeping man with a stick which woke him up Ajātaśatru taught Bālāki that the individual soul is different from the body, breath, etc. So it is the individual soul that is taught here. This objection is refuted by the word 'but' in the *Sūtra*. Jaimini thinks that the reference to the individual soul is to teach the Brahman which is different from it. This is borne out by the questions and answers that follow in the text. After establishing the individual soul Ajātaśatru asks, 'Where did this person sleep, where was he and whence has he come back?' (*Kau.* IV. 19). These questions are asked to propound the Brahman in which the soul in deep sleep abides. The answer also, 'Then he becomes one with this Prāṇa alone', refers to Brahman. The Prāṇa in which the soul abides in deep sleep refers to Brahman as something different from the individual self. The same idea is expressed in, 'Then he becomes united with the True' (*Chā.* VI. viii. 1).

Moreover, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, in which also this question and answer occurs, clearly points out the indi-

individual soul by the term *viññānamaya*, the person consisting of cognition, and distinguishes it from the supreme Self. *Vide Br. II. i. 16-17.*

So the object of knowledge mentioned in the *Kauṣītaki* texts is something different from the individual soul viz the first Cause and not the individual soul or the Pradhāna presided over by it.

Topic 6 : The Self to be seen through hearing etc. is Brahman

In the last topic the clause, 'Whose work this is', was interpreted to refer to the world and not to action. Thereby it was shown that the text does not refer to the individual soul but to Brahman, as the latter was the subject matter referred to at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of the passage under discussion.

Now is taken up for discussion the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* passage where the individual soul is clearly referred to at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the passage. Therefore the opponent holds that the individual soul ought to be the subject matter of the passage according to the argument given in the previous topic. This topic is begun to show that it refers to Brahman and not to the individual soul.

वाक्यान्वयात् ॥ १६ ॥

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, etc. is Brahman) on account of the connected meaning of the passages.

In the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upani-*

śad, Yājñavalkya, in reply to Maitreyī's question as to the way to immortality, says 'Verily the husband is dear not for the sake of the husband but for the sake of the Self a husband is dear' etc. (II. iv. 5) and then concludes by saying, 'The Self is to be seen—should be heard, reflected on, and meditated upon. By the realization of the Self alone, my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is known.' The question is : Who is referred to by the word 'Self' in this passage—is it the Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya or the supreme Brahman? The Sāṃkhya hold that it is the Puruṣa. For it is the individual soul that is referred to at the beginning, in the middle and at the end. At the beginning the 'Self' is said to be attached to the husband, wife, son etc. which shows it is the individual soul. In the middle of the passage it is said that the 'Self' is connected with origination and destruction ; *Vide II. iv. 12*, and ends by saying, 'Through what, my dear, should one know the knower?' (II. iv. 14). Therefore the 'Self' is the individual soul, the Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya. The knowledge of this 'Self', as distinguished from Prakṛti, is what leads to immortality, according to the Sāṃkhya. So the 'Self to be seen' is the individual soul as differentiated from Prakṛti. The knowledge of the 'Self' will result in the knowledge of all souls ; for the souls as distinguished from Prakṛti, are not differentiated as gods, men etc. but are alike.

This view is refuted by this *Sūtra*. Because from the connection of the various passages, it is clear that the supreme Brahman is taught and not the individual soul. The passage begins by saying that wealth does not conduce to immortality. In reply to this statement of Yājñavalkya, Maitreyī who was desirous of immortality says, 'What shall I do with that through which I cannot attain immortality ?

Tell me, venerable sir, of that alone which you know (to be the means to immortality)' (II. iv. 3). Therefore the 'Self' that is taught to be seen cannot be the individual soul but Brahman. For scriptures say that immortality is attained only through the knowledge of Brahman. 'Knowing Him only does one go beyond death', 'Knowing Him thus one becomes immortal here, there is no other means to this' (Śve. III. 8). So the supreme Brahman is taught in the text under discussion : 'The Self is to be seen' etc. Again, being the cause of the entire world, as mentioned in : 'From that great Being emanated the *R̥g Veda* etc.' can be true only of Brahman and not of the individual soul which, in the state of bondage is under the influence of Karma, and in the state of release, has nothing to do with the world. So also the enunciation that by the knowledge of the Self everything is known shows that it is the supreme Brahman which is the Self of all. The knowledge of the soul according to the Sāṅkhya, as differentiated from Prakṛti, does not give a knowledge of the insentient world ; and so the knowledge of the soul does not result in the knowledge of everything. This Brāhmaṇa, this Kṣatriya, these worlds, these gods, these beings, and all this are only the Self' (Br. III. ii. 63) —in this text the sentient and insentient world of perception is described as 'this' and identified with the Self and this is possible only if it is Brahman, and not the individual soul, whether in the state of bondage as identified with Prakṛti or in the state of release as differentiated from Prakṛti. Moreover, the epithets used with reference to it in 'This great, endless, infinite Reality' etc. can be true only of the supreme Brahman. The passage proclaiming that husband, wife, wealth, etc. and in fact all things dear to man are so, not for their own sake but for the sake of the Ātman,

signifies that Brahman is the sole object of pursuit. The reason adduced is that whatever is dear to man is so not because of its own intrinsic volition to that effect but because of the gracious will of Brahman. As such the ultimate object of man's love must be this supreme Source of the value of all that he values in his life. There is no point, the argument urges, in seeking things of derivative value and also in seeking the individual soul, which is itself impoverished and deficient, without the objects through which it seeks self-fulfilment.

In *Br.* II. iv. 12 and also in many other texts, the words denoting the individual self mean the highest Self, and are used in grammatical equation with the word denoting Him. The Sūtra-kāra supports this according to the views of other Acaryas in the following *Sūtras*.

प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेलिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ॥ २० ॥

20. (The fact that the individual soul is taught as the object of realization is an) indicative mark (which is) proof of the proposition, so Āśmarathya thinks.

The word denoting the individual soul is used to indicate the supreme Brahman, to show that the former is an effect of the latter and therefore not different from It, thus establishing the promissory statement that by the knowledge of one thing the knowledge of everything is gained—so argues Āśmarathya. *Vide Mu.* II. i. 1 where it is said that the individual souls are brought forth from the Imperishable like sparks from a fire and return to It also. So they are one with Brahman in so far as they are Its effects. On this ground the word denoting the individual soul denotes the supreme Self also.

उत्क्रमिष्यत एवं भावादित्यौडुलोमिः ॥ २१ ॥

21. Because of this nature (viz possessing the characteristics of Brahman) of the individual soul which rises from the body (at the time of release), thus (thinks) Auḍulomi.

'Now that serene and happy being, rising out of this body and reaching the highest light, appears in its own true form' (Chā. VIII. iii. 4)—this text shows that the released soul possesses the characteristics of the supreme Brahman, therefore the word referring to the individual soul is used to denote the supreme Brahman—so thinks Auḍulomi.

अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥ २२ ॥

22. On account of Brahman abiding in the individual soul—so thinks Kāśakṛtsna.

'He who resides in the self' etc. (Br. III. vii. 22) shows that the supreme Brahman is the inner Self of the individual soul which forms Its body. On this identity of the two selves related to each other as the soul and the body, the word denoting the individual soul is used to denote the supreme Brahman. This is the view of Kāśakṛtsna.

The three views expressed above are contradictory, and after the last one no other view is expressed by the Sūtrākāra nor is the last one refuted by him. So the last one viz the view of Kāśakṛtsna seems to be the view of the Sūtrākāra also.

Topic 7 : Brahman is the material cause also

प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥ २३ ॥

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, (on account

of this view alone) not being contradictory to the proposition and illustrations (cited in the Śruti).

In the previous topic it was shown that the Self to be seen was the supreme Brahman. The argument was based on the proposition, 'By the knowledge of one thing everything is known'. This is possible only if the 'Self' to be seen is the cause of the whole universe, sentient and insentient. The individual self cannot be such a cause of the whole universe of sentient and insentient beings. So it was established that the supreme Self is the object of knowledge prescribed in the text. This shows that Brahman is also the material cause of the universe.

An objection is raised that Brahman cannot be both the efficient and material cause of the world, as it is contrary to common experience. In the world we see the potter and the clay—the efficient and material causes respectively of the pot—are different from each other. Similarly Brahman cannot be both these causes. That Brahman is the efficient cause of the world is known from texts like, 'It thought... It created Prāṇa' (Pra. VI. 3-4).

That the efficient and material causes of the world are different is known from texts like, 'From that, the Lord of Māyā sends forth all this'; 'Know Māyā is Prakṛti, and the great Lord is the Māyin' (Śve. IV. 9-10). Moreover, scriptures declare that Brahman is unchangeable. Therefore Brahman can only be the efficient cause and not also the material cause. So we have to infer the existence of a Pradhāna which serves as the material cause, though not clearly declared in the scriptures. 'Animating My Prakṛti I project again and again this whole multitude of beings' etc. (Gītā, IX. 8)—this text clearly declares the existence of a Prakṛti different from Brahman.

This view is refuted by this *Sūtra* which declares that Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the universe. For otherwise, texts like, 'By which what is not heard becomes heard' etc. (*Chā. VI. i. 3*), which declare that by the knowledge of Brahman everything is known, would be meaningless. If Brahman is the material cause of the universe, then as effects are not different from the cause, the proposition will hold true. The illustration given to explain this, viz. 'My dear, as by the knowledge of one lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known' etc. (*Chā. VI. i. 4*), also establishes that Brahman is the material cause. As Brahman has for Its body the whole world of sentient and insentient beings in the causal and effected states as modes, there can be no contradiction in Its being both the causes. The change at creation is only in the insentient part of Its body which was in a fine condition before creation and which manifests in a gross form assuming names and forms in the effected state. There is no change in Brahman as such in this modification, even as in a child, when it grows up to be a youth, there is no change in the person but only in the body. So Brahman is changeless, as texts describe It. Even though Brahman, having for Its body the sentient and insentient beings, is the material cause, texts like, 'From that the Lord of Māyā sends forth all this (universe) . . . In this the other is bound up through Māyā' (*Śve. IV. 9*) show that It is not in any way affected by the imperfections or changes in the world. Therefore, on account of the proposition and illustrations given in the Śruti texts, Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.

अभिध्योपदेशाच्च ॥ २४ ॥

24. Also on account of the statement of will (to create

on the part of Brahman, It is the material cause).

'It wished : May I be many, may I grow forth' etc. (*Chā. VI. ii. 3*)—this text shows that Brahman wished to become many, as the world of multiplicity. This shows that It is both the efficient and material cause.

साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नानात् ॥ २५ ॥

25. And because the Śruti texts directly declare (that It is) both (the efficient and material cause of the world).

Scriptures directly declare that Brahman is both the causes. 'What was the wood, what was the tree, from which they have built this earth and heaven ? . . . Whereon it stood supporting the worlds ?'—in this text a question is asked as to the efficient and material cause of the world. The reply given in the text is, 'Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they built heaven and earth . . . it stood on Brahman supporting the worlds' (*Tai. Brā. II. 8-9*). Therefore Brahman is both the causes.

आत्मकृतेः ॥ २६ ॥

26. (Brahman is the material cause of the world) because (Śruti says that) It created Itself.

'That Itself manifested Itself' (*Tai. II. 7*)—this text shows that Brahman, the creator, manifested Itself as the world. Therefore Brahman is both the causes. It is possible for the same thing to be both the agent and the object of activity as not having and having names and forms, i.e. as existing in a fine state without names and forms, and manifesting itself in a gross form with names and forms.

An objection is raised : If Brahman manifests Itself as

the world which is full of imperfections, ignorance, misery, change etc. then Brahman would cease to be free from evil, all-knowing, infinitely blissful, etc. This objection is answered by the next Sūtra.

परिणामात् ॥ २७ ॥

27. On account of modification (it is possible).

The modification taught by the Vedānta texts is as follows : Brahman has for Its body the universe of sentient and insentient beings in an extremely subtle form before creation. At the time of creation Brahman wills to create the world in its gross form : and Its body undergoes a modification and develops names and forms. 'This universe was then unmanifested. It manifested itself only as name and form' etc. (Bṛ. I. iv. 7). In both conditions Brahman is Its inner Self. All imperfections, ignorance etc. belong to the sentient world which forms one part of Its body, and all change is in the insentient world which forms the other part of Its body. But Brahman, the inner Self, remains ever blissful, free from all imperfections, all-knowing, unchanged etc.

That the whole universe of sentient and insentient beings is Brahman's body and that It is its inner Self, is declared by the text, 'He who is inside the earth...whose body is the earth' etc. (Bṛ. III. vii. 3) up to the end of the section. Many more texts can be quoted in support of this declaration.

योनिश्च हि गीयते ॥ २८ ॥

28. And because (Brahman) is called the origin.

'That which the wise regard as the origin of all things'

(Mu. I. i. 6). Vide also Mu. III. i. 3. These texts show that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

Topic 8 : All Vedānta texts refer to Brahman alone as the first cause

एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः ॥ २९ ॥

29. By this all (texts relating to the cause of the world) are explained (as referring to Brahman alone).

In these four Pādas of this chapter, it has been shown by various arguments that Vedānta texts which relate to the origin of the world declare only an all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman which is different from the sentient and insentient world. By this, i.e. by the arguments hitherto given, all texts which refer to the cause of the world, other than those already explained in these Pādas, are also explained as referring to Brahman alone.

The repetition of the verb in the aphorism shows that the chapter ends here.