

The detailed reference to the three states of the individual soul (Jîva) is meant not to establish the nature of the individual soul as such, but to show finally its real nature, which is non-different from Brahman.

अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्, तदुक्तम् ॥ २१ ॥

अल्पश्रुतेः Because of the Śruti declaring its smallness इति चेत् if it be said तत् that उक्तम् has already been explained.

21. If it be said that because the Śruti declares the limitedness (of this Ākāśa, therefore it cannot refer to the all-pervading Brahman); (we say) that has already been explained (as having reference to devout meditation only. *vide* 1. 2. 7).

Topic 6: That which shining, everything shines is Brahman.

In the last section, in the text quoted (Ch. 8. 12. 3) there is mention of 'the highest light'. This section is introduced to prove that what was referred to as 'light' is Brahman, and for this other texts are taken up for discussion in which this 'light' is mentioned.

अनुकृतेस्तस्य च ॥ २२ ॥

अनुकृतेः Because of the acting after तस्य Its च and.

22. Because of the acting after (*i.e.* shining after) (That which shining, everything else

shines) and (because by) Its (light everything else is lighted).

"There the sun does not shine, nor the moon...It shining, everything else shines after It, by Its light all this is lighted" (Mu. 2. 2. 11). Here 'It' refers to the supreme Brahman, the pure Consciousness, and not to any material light besides the sun and the moon. It is absurd to say that one light is lighted by another. Nor do we know of any material light besides the sun that can light it. 'It shining, everything else shines' shows that it is the principle of Intelligence which shines first of all. 'By its light all this is lighted' shows that it is the light of Intelligence, Consciousness or Brahman which illumines the whole world, luminous and non-luminous. That Brahman is self-luminous we learn from texts like, "It is the light of lights".

अपि च स्मर्यते ॥ २३ ॥

अपि च Moreover स्मर्यते the Smṛti states.

23. Moreover the Smṛti states (It to be the universal light).

"That the sun illumines not" etc. (Gîtâ 15. 6) and also "The light which residing in the sun illumines the whole world, that which is in the moon and in the fire—know that light to be Mine" (Gîtâ 15. 12).

Topic 7: The person of the size of a thumb is Brahman.

शब्दादेव प्रमितः ॥ २४ ॥

शब्दात् From the word एवं itself प्रमितः measured.

24. From the very word ('Lord' by which it is referred to in the text) (the being) measured (by the size of the thumb is Brahman).

"The being of the size of a thumb, resides in the centre of the body. (Knowing that) Lord of the past and future, one does not seek to hide oneself any more. This is That" (Ka. 2. 4. 12). The being referred to is Brahman, because he is spoken of as the Lord or ruler of the past and future. It cannot be the individual soul, though the limitation in size and residence in the centre of the body by themselves might be more applicable in its case. Moreover in reply to the request of Naciketa who wanted to know Brahman, Yama refers to this being of the size of a thumb thus: "That which you wanted to know is this."

हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

हृदि-अपेक्षया With reference to the heart तु but मनुष्य-अधिकारत्वात् man (alone) being entitled.

25. But with reference to (the space in) the heart (the highest Brahman is said to be of the size of a thumb); (and because) man alone is entitled (to the study of the Vedas).

How could the all-prevading Brahman be of the size of a thumb, as stated by the previous Sûtra? Because the space in the heart is of the size of a thumb, therefore Brahman, with reference to Its abiding within that space, is described as being of the size of a thumb. Since Brahman abides within the heart of all living creatures, why is the 'thumb' used as a standard?

Because man alone is entitled to the study of the Vedas and to the different Upâsanâs of Brahman prescribed in them, therefore it is with reference to him that thumb is used as the standard of measurement.

Topic 8: The right of the gods to the study of the Vedas

तदुपरि बादरायणः संभवात् ॥ २६ ॥

तदुपरि Above them अपि also बादरायणः Bâdarâyana संभवात् because (it is) possible.

26. (Beings) above them (men) also (are entitled to the study of the Vedas) because (it is) possible (for them also to attain Knowledge according to) Bâdarâyana.

In Sûtras 26-38 there is a digression from the main topic in the Section. A doubt may arise from the previous Sûtra that as it is said that men alone are entitled to the study of the Vedas, the gods are thereby debarred. To remove this doubt that Sûtra is given. The gods are also entitled to it, according to Bâdarâyana. How? Because it is possible for them also—since they too are corporeal beings—to have a desire for Brahmaloaka or for final illumination and also to possess the necessary requisites (the four-fold qualification) for such illumination. In the Śruti also we find Indra and other gods living the life of Brahmacharya for attaining this knowledge of Brahman. For instance, Ch. 8. 11. 3; also Tai. 3. 1, where the god Varuṇa is said to have possessed that Knowledge which he teaches to his son Bhṛgu.

विरोधः कर्मणीति चेत्, अनेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् ॥ २७ ॥

विरोधः Contradiction कर्मणि to sacrifices इति चेत् if it be said न not अनेक-प्रतिपत्तेः the assumption of many (forms) दर्शनात् because it is found (in the scriptures).

27. If it be said (that the corporeality of the gods would involve) a contradiction to sacrifices; (we say) no, because we find (in the scriptures) the assumption (by the gods) of many (forms at one and the same time).

If gods possess bodies, then it would not be possible for one and the same god to be present in sacrifices performed simultaneously at different places. This is the objection, which is refuted by the latter part of the Sûtra on the ground that the gods, like the Yogîs, owing to their Yoga powers are capable of assuming several forms (Kâyavyûha) simultaneously. See Ch. 7. 26. 2. Again as a sacrifice consists in making offerings by the sacrificer to some divinity, many persons at the same time may make such offerings to a single divinity, even as many persons can at the same time salute a single person.

शब्द इति चेत्, न, अतः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ॥ २८ ॥

शब्दे With regard to (Vedic) words इति चेत् if it be said न no अतः from these (words) प्रभवात् because of the creation प्रत्यक्ष-अनुमानाभ्याम् from direct perception and inference.

28. If it be said (that the corporeality of the gods would involve a contradiction) with regard

to (Vedic) words, (we say) no, because of the creation (of the world together with the gods) from these (words), (as is known) from direct perception (Śruti) and inference (Smṛti).

A further objection is raised with respect to the corporeality of the gods. If they have a body, they too like men would be subject to births and deaths. Now all the words in the Vedas according to Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ are eternal. So also every word has for its counterpart a form, an object which it denotes. The relation between a name or word and form (the object) is eternal. The word or name, its object, and their relation are eternal verities. Now in the Vedas we find words like Indra, Varuṇa, etc.—the names of the gods. If these gods are eternal, since they possess bodies, then these words cannot have their eternal counterpart, the object. So the eternity and authoritativeness of the Vedas, which are based on the eternal relation between the word and its object, would be a myth. This is the main objection. It is answered thus. Each word of the Vedas has an objective counterpart, which is not an individual but a type. The word 'cow', for instance, has for its counterpart the object, which is a type and as such is eternal and does not depend on the birth or death of individuals belonging to that type. Similar is the case with words like Indra, Varuṇa, etc. Words representing the gods etc. have for their counterpart objects that are types and not individuals. Again Indra is the name of any one who would occupy that exalted position, like the word 'king' in ordinary parlance. So there is no contradiction to Vedic words. As a matter of fact, the world

including the gods etc. have originated from Vedic words. This does not mean that the Vedic words constitute the material cause of these things, which Brahman alone is, as stated in Sûtra 1. 1. 2. What then is meant? According to Indian philosophy the universe and its objects have both name and form as the conditions of their manifestation. There can be no mental state (Citta-vṛtti) unconditioned by name and form. The thought wave first manifests as a word and then as the more concrete form. The idea is the essence, and the form is, as it were, the outer crust. What is true of the individual mind is also true of the cosmic mind. In this sense only is the world said to be created, rather manifested, from the Vedic words. This is endorsed by the Śruti and Smṛti. In the Vedas it is said that the Lord uttered different words before creating different types of beings (*vide* Br. 1. 2. 4). "The several names, actions, and conditions of all things He shaped in the beginning from the words of the Vedas" (Manu 1.21).

अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ॥ २९ ॥

अत एव From this very reason च also नित्यत्वम् the eternity.

29. From this very reason also (results) the eternity (of the Vedas).

Since the objects are eternal, that is, gods etc. as types are eternal, the Vedic words are eternal. This establishes the eternal nature of the Vedas. The Vedas were not written by anybody. They are impersonal and eternal. The Ṛsis only discovered them but were not authors of the Vedic texts. "By means of their past

good deeds (the priests) attained the capacity to understand the Vedas; (then) they found them dwelling in the Ṛsis" (Rg-Veda 10.71.3), which shows that the Vedas are eternal.

समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात्

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ३० ॥

समान-नामरूपत्वात् Because of similar names and forms च and आवृत्तौ in the revolving of the world cycles अपि even अवरोधः no contradiction दर्शनात् from the Śruti स्मृतेः from the Smṛti च and.

30. And because of the sameness of names and forms (in every fresh cycle) there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the Vedic words) even in the revolving of the world cycles, as is seen from the Śruti and the Smṛti.

An objection is raised. Since at the end of a cycle everything is completely destroyed and creation begins afresh at the beginning of the next cycle, there is a break in the continuity of existence; so even as types the gods are not eternal. This upsets the eternal relation of Vedic words and the objects they represent, and consequently the eternity of the Vedas and their authority fall to the ground. This Sûtra refutes it. Just as a person after waking from deep-sleep finds no break in the continuity of existence, so also in the state of Pralaya (end of a cycle) the world is in a potential state—in seed form—in ignorance, and not completely destroyed; at the beginning of the next cycle it is again manifested into a gross form with all the previous

variety of names and forms. As the world does not become absolutely non-existent, the eternity of the relation between Vedic words and their objects is not contradicted, and consequently the authoritativeness of the Vedas remains. This eternal existence of the world in gross and fine forms alternatively and the similarity of the names and forms are brought out by the Śruti and Smṛti texts. "As formerly the Lord ordered the sun and the moon, heaven, earth, the sky" etc. Rg-Veda 10.190. 3).

मध्वादिष्वसंभवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ॥ ३१ ॥

मध्वादिषु In Madhu Vidyâ etc. असंभवात् on account of the impossibility अनधिकारं disqualification जैमिनिः Jaimini (is of opinion).

31. On account of the impossibility (of the gods) being qualified for Madhu Vidyâ. etc. Jaimini (is of opinion that the gods) are not qualified (either for Upâsanâs or for the knowledge of Brahman).

In many of the Upâsanâs (devout meditations) a person is asked to meditate on the self of some god or other. For example, in Madhu Vidyâ one is to meditate on the sun as honey (something helpful). Such a meditation will be impossible for the sun-god. Hence in Upâsanâs where one has to meditate on the self of certain gods, these divinities themselves would naturally be disqualified; for the same person cannot be both the object of meditation and the worshipper. So Jaimini thinks that the gods are not qualified for these devout meditations or for the knowledge of the supreme Brahman.

ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ॥ ३२ ॥

ज्योतिषि As mere spheres of light भावात् because (used) in the sense च and.

32. And (the gods are not qualified for Vidyâs) because (the words 'sun', 'moon', etc. spoken of as gods) are used in the sense of mere spheres of light.

A further objection is given. There is no proof as to the existence of gods with hands, feet, etc., and with desires—which would qualify them for meditations and Knowledge. These are mere names of planets and luminary objects and as such are material inert things. Consequently they are not qualified for any kind of Vidyâ (meditation) prescribed in the scriptures.

भावं तु बादरायणः, अस्ति हि ॥ ३३ ॥

भावं The existence (of qualification) तु but बादरायणः (sage) Bâdarâyana(maintains) अस्ति does exist हि because.

33. But Bâdarâyana (maintains) the existence (of qualification on the part of the gods for the knowledge of Brahman), because (all those causes like body, desires, etc., which qualify one for such knowledge) do exist (in the case of the gods).

Bâdarâyana thinks that besides the luminary orbs like the sun, moon, etc., each of them has a presiding deity of that name with body, intelligence, desires,

etc., and as such there being all the causes which can qualify them for the Upâsanâs and supreme Knowledge, the gods also are entitled to them. The fact that the sun-god cannot be entitled to Madhu Vidyâ because he cannot meditate on the sun, *i.e.* himself, does not disqualify him for other devout meditations or for the knowledge of Brahman. Similar is the case with other gods.

Topic 9: The right of the Śûdras to the Study of the Vedas discussed.

शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्, तदाद्रवणात्, सूच्यते हि ॥ ३४ ॥

शुक् Grief अस्य his तत्-अनादरश्रवणात् from hearing his (the R̥ṣi's) contemptuous words तत् that (grief) आद्रवणात् owing to his approaching सूच्यते is referred to हि because.

34. His (king Jânaśruti's) grief (arose) from hearing the contemptuous words (of the R̥ṣi in the form of a swan); owing to his approaching (Raikva overwhelmed with) that (grief) (Raikva called him Śûdra); because it (the grief) is referred to (by Raikva, who could read his mind).

In the previous Sûtra it has been shown that the gods are entitled to the Vedas and Knowledge. This Sûtra discusses whether the Śûdras are entitled to them or not. Since, like the gods, the Śûdras also are possessed of a body, strength, and desires, it naturally follows that they too are entitled. In Chândogya 4.2.5 Raikva

at first calls Jânaśruti, a Śûdra, when he comes for instruction with presents, which are refused. But when he appears a second time, Raikva again calls him a Śûdra, but this time accepts his presents and teaches him. So it is maintained that the Śûdras also are qualified for Knowledge.

This Sûtra refutes the view and denies the right to the study of the Vedas for a Śûdra by caste, since the word 'Śûdra' occurring in the text referred to does not denote a Śûdra by birth, which is its conventional meaning, for Jânaśruti was a Kṣatriya king (Ch. 4.1.3). Here we must take the etymological meaning of the word, which is "He rushed into grief" or "He in his grief immediately approached Raikva". The following Sûtra also shows that he was a Kṣatriya.

क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्चोत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् ॥ ३५ ॥

क्षत्रियत्वगतेः (His) Kṣatriyahood being known च and उत्तरत्र later on चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् by the indicative sign (of his being mentioned) along with a descendant of Chitraratha (a Kṣatriya).

35. And because the Kṣatriyahood (of Jânaśruti) is known later on by the indicative sign (of his being mentioned) along with a descendant of Chitraratha (a Kṣatriya).

Jânaśruti is mentioned with the Kṣatriya Chaitraratha Abhipratârin in connection with the same Vidyâ, and so we can infer that Jânaśruti also was a Kṣatriya, for as a rule equals alone are mentioned together.

संस्कारपरामर्शात् तदभावाभिलापाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

संस्कार-परामर्शात् Purificatory ceremonies being mentioned
तत्-अभाव-अभिलापात् its absence being declared च and.

36. Because purificatory ceremonies are mentioned (in the case of the twice-born) and their absence are declared (in the case of the Śûdras).

Purificatory ceremonies like Upanayana etc. are declared by the scriptures to be a necessary condition of the study of all kinds of knowledge or Vidyâ; but these are meant only for the higher castes. Their absence in the case of the Śûdras is repeatedly declared in the scriptures. "Śûdras do not incur sin (by eating prohibited food), nor have they any purificatory rights" etc. (Manu 10.12.6). Consequently they are not entitled to the study of the Vedas.

तदभावाभिधाने च प्रवृत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

तदभाव-निर्धारणे On the ascertainment of the absence
of that (Śûdrahood) च and प्रवृत्तेः from inclination.

37. And because the inclination (on the part of Gautama to impart Knowledge is seen only) on the ascertainment of the absence of Śûdrahood (in Jâbâla Satyakâma).

That śûdras are not qualified is known also from the fact that great teachers like Gautama made sure

before imparting Knowledge that disciples like Jâbâla Satyakâma were not Śûdras. See Ch. 4.4.5.

श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात् स्मृतेश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

श्रवण-अध्ययन-अर्थ-प्रतिषेधात् Because of the prohibition
of hearing, studying, and understanding स्मृतेः in the
Smṛti च and.

38. And because of the prohibition in the Smṛti of hearing and studying (the Vedas) and knowing their meaning and performing Vedic rites (to Śûdras, they are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman).

Śûtras 34-38 disqualify the Śûdra for the knowledge of Brahman through the study of the Vedas. But it is possible for them to attain that knowledge through the Purâṇas and the epics (*Râmâyana* and *Mahâbhârata*).

The digression begun from Sûtra 26 ends here and the general topic is again taken up.

Topic 10: The Prâna in which everything trembles is Brahman.

In topic 7 it was proved that the reference to the Jîva was to inculcate the knowledge of Brahman, as the former is really identical with Brahman. But in the text to be discussed 'Prâna' cannot refer to Brahman as such identity is not possible—this seems to be the line of thinking of the opponent, who therefore takes up this topic for discussion.

कम्पनात् ॥ ३९ ॥

कम्पनात् On account of vibration.

39. (Prāṇa is Brahman) on account of the vibration (spoken of the whole world).

“Whatever there is in the whole world has come out of and trembles in the Prāṇa” etc. (Ka. 2.6.2). Here ‘Prāṇa’ is Brahman and not the vital force. Why? First because of the context, since Brahman is the topic in the previous and subsequent texts. Again “The whole world trembles in Prāṇa”—in this we have reference to an attribute of Brahman, It being the abode of the whole world. It is the cause of the life of the whole world including the Prāṇa. Lastly, immortality is declared to him who knows this Prāṇa, and ‘Prāṇa’ is also often used to denote Brahman in the Śruti.

Topic 11: The ‘light’ is Brahman.

In the last topic ‘Prāṇa’ was taken to mean Brahman from the context. But in the text taken up for discussion in this topic, there is no such context by which ‘light’ can be taken to be Brahman—so says the opponent.

ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ॥ ४० ॥

ज्योतिः Light दर्शनात् on account of (Brahman) being seen.

40. Light (is Brahman) on account of (Brahman) being seen (as the subject of the texts).

“Thus does that serene being, arising from the body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light.” (Ch. 8.12.3). Here ‘highest light’ stands for Brahman. Why? Because Brahman is the subject of the whole section. The ‘highest light’ is also called the highest Person in that text itself later on. Freedom from the body is said to belong to that being which is one with this ‘light’. Disembodied state or Freedom can arise only from being identified with Brahman.

Topic 12: The Ākāśa which reveals names and forms is Brahman

आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४१ ॥

आकाशः Ākāśa अर्थान्तरत्वादि-व्यपदेशात् because it is declared to be something different etc.

41 Ākāśa (is Brahman) because it is declared to be something different etc. (from names and forms and yet their revealer).

“That which is called Ākāśa is the revealer of all names and forms. That within which these names and forms are, is Brahman, the immortal, the Self” (Ch. 8.14.1).

Here ‘Ākāśa’ is Brahman. Why? Because names and forms are said to be within this Ākāśa, which is therefore different from these. In this phenomenal world everything is conditioned by name and form, and Brahman alone is beyond them. Ākāśa is said to be the revealer of names and forms; and as the inner Ruler

of the whole world of names and forms it cannot be anything else but Brahman. Moreover, epithets like 'Infinite', 'Immortal', 'Self' also show that 'Ākāśa' here refers to Brahman.

Topic 13: The Self consisting of knowledge is not the individual soul but Brahman.

In the previous topic because Ākāśa was spoken of as different from names and forms, it was taken as Brahman. This argument is objected to by the opponent, who cites that even difference is spoken of with respect to the individual soul and Brahman, who are really identical. So this topic is taken up for discussion.

सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन ॥ ४२ ॥

सुषुप्ति-उत्क्रान्त्योः In deep-sleep and death भेदेन as different.

42. Because of the supreme Self being shown as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep-sleep and death.

In the sixth chapter of the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, in reply to the question, "Which is that Self" (4.3.7), a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self is given. The question is whether the Self is the supreme Self or the individual soul. This Sūtra says it is the supreme Self. Why? Because it is shown to be different from the individual self in the state of deep-sleep and at the time of death. "This person, embraced by the supremely in-

telligent Self, knows nothing that is without or within" (Br. 4.3.21), which shows that in deep-sleep the 'person' which represents the individual soul, is different from the supreme Self, called here the supremely intelligent Self.

The 'person' is the individual soul, because the absence of the knowledge of external things and things within in deep-sleep can be predicated only of the individual soul, which is the knower, and the supremely intelligent Self is Brahman because such intelligence can be predicated of Brahman only. Similarly at the time of death (Br. 4.3.35). Therefore Brahman is the chief topic in this section. The extensive discourse on the individual soul in this section is not to establish its Jīvahood, but to show that it is in reality not different from Brahman.

पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ॥ ४३ ॥

43. On account of words like 'Lord' etc. (the Self in the text under discussion is the supreme Self).

Epithets like 'Lord', 'Ruler', etc. are applied to the 'Self' discussed in the text (Vide Br. 4.4.22), and those are apt only in the case of Brahman, for these epithets show that the thing spoken of is beyond bondage. So the word 'Self' denotes the supreme Self and not the Jīva.

CHAPTER I

SECTION IV

In top c 5, section I, it has been shown that as the Sâmkhyan Pradhâna is not based on scriptural authority and that as the Śruti texts all refer to an intelligent principle as the first Cause, Brahman is that first Cause. In all the subsequent Sûtras of the first three sections it has been shown how all the Vedânta texts refer to Brahman. Now the fact that the Pradhâna is not based on scriptural authority is questioned by the opponent, and his objections are being answered. The whole of section 4 practically answers all objections from the Sâmkhyan standpoint.

Topic 1: The Mahat and Avyakta of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad do not refer to the Sâmkhyan categories.

In the last topic of the previous section, by a reference to the well-known individual soul, Brahman, which is not so well known, was taught. So the opponent in this topic holds that the reference to Avyakta in the text to be quoted should be taken to deal with the well-known Sâmkhyan category.

आनुमानिकमन्येकेषामिति चेत्, न, शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेः,

दर्शयति च ॥ १ ॥

आनुमानिकम् That which is inferred (i.e. the Pra-

dhâna) अपि also एकेषाम् in some (recensions of the texts) इति चेत् if it be said न no शरीर-रूपक-विन्यस्त-गृहीतेः because it is mentioned in a simile referring to the body दर्शयति (the Śruti) explains च too.

1. If it be said that in some (recensions of the Vedas) that which is inferred (i.e. the Pradhâna) (is) also (mentioned), (we say) no, because (the word 'Avyakta' occurring in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad) is mentioned in a simile referring to the body (and means the body itself and not the Pradhâna of the Sâmkhyas); (the Śruti) too explains (it).

An objection is again raised here by the Sâmkhyas that the Pradhâna is also based on scriptural authority, for some Śâkhâs (Vedic recensions) like the Kaṭha Śâkhâ (school) contain expressions wherein the Pradhâna seems to be referred to: "Beyond the Mahat (Great) there is the Avyakta (Undeveloped), beyond the Undeveloped is the Puruṣa (Being)" etc. (Ka. 1.3.11). The word 'Avyakta', they say, here refers to the Pradhâna. Because the words 'Mahat', 'Avyakta', and 'Puruṣa', which occur in the same order as mentioned in the Sâmkhya philosophy, occur in the text, and so they are recognized to be the same categories of the Sâmkhyas.

This Sûtra after raising this objection refutes it thus: The word 'Avyakta' is used in connection with a simile referring to the body, and does not refer to the Pradhâna. In that word we recognize something mentioned in an earlier text. "Know that the soul is the rider of the

chariot and the body the chariot. Consider the intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins. The senses, they say, are the horses, and their roads are the sense-objects" etc. (Ka. 1.3.3-4). All these things that are referred to in these verses are to be found in the following: "The objects are superior to the senses, the mind is superior to the objects, the intellect is superior to the mind, the Mahat is superior again to the intellect, the Avyakta is superior to the Mahat, and the Purusa is superior to the Avyakta. Nothing is superior to the Purusa," etc. (Ka. 1.3.10-11).

Now compare these two quotations. The senses, mind and intellect, mentioned in the earlier texts, are to be found in these later texts. The Ātman of the earlier texts is denoted by the 'Puruṣa' of the later ones. The Mahat of the later texts mean the cosmic intellect and so is included in the intellect of the earlier texts, where it is used in a comprehensive sense to include both the individual and cosmic intellects. What remains is only the body in the earlier texts, and Avyakta in the later texts; and so Avyakta means the body here and not the Pradhâna. We shall not be justified in interpreting a Śruti according to Sâmkhyan technicalities. For the purpose of recognition a comparison should be made not with the Smṛti, but with similar passages of the Śruti itself, like those cited above.

सूक्ष्मं तु तदहंत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

सूक्ष्मं Subtle तु but तदहंत्वात् because it can be properly so designated.

2. But the subtle (cause of the body is meant

by the term 'Avyakta') because it can be properly so designated.

An objection is raised. As the body is gross and developed, how can it be referred to by the term 'Avyakta' (Undeveloped)? The answer is, here, not the gross body but the causal substance, *e.* the five un-compounded elements out of which the body is built, is meant. They, being subtle and not fully manifest and also being beyond sense perception, can be properly designated by the term 'Avyakta' (Undeveloped) It is also a common thing to denote the effect by the cause and hence indirectly the gross body is referred to here. "Mix the Soma with the cow (*i.e.* milk)" (Rg-Veda 9.46.4).

तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ॥ ३ ॥

तदधीनत्वात् On account of its dependence अर्थवत् is fitting.

3. On account of its dependence (on the Lord), it fits in (with our theory).

It may be said that if a subtle causal condition of the gross world is thus admitted, it is as good as accepting the Pradhâna. This Sûtra makes the difference clear. While the Pradhâna of the Sâmkhyas is an independent entity, the subtle causal condition admitted here is dependent on the supreme Lord. Such a causal condition has necessarily to be admitted, for without that the Lord cannot create. It is the potential power, the

causal potentiality inherent in Brahman. It is Nescience. That explains why, when one's ignorance is destroyed by Knowledge, there is no possibility of that liberated soul getting into bondage again. About this ignorance you can neither say that it is, nor that it is not; it is an illusion and so it is reasonably called Undeveloped (Avyakta). This ignorance or creative power cannot create of itself without the instrumentality of the Lord. The illusion of a snake in a rope is not possible merely through ignorance without the rope. So also the world cannot be created merely by ignorance without the substratum, the Lord. Hence it is dependent on the Lord. Yet the Lord is not in the least affected by this ignorance, even as the poison does not affect the snake which has it. "Know then Prakṛti is Mâyâ and the great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ" (Śv. 4.10). So the Avyakta is a helper, as it were, to Īśvara in His creation, and hence such an Avyakta dependent on the Lord is significant and has to be admitted, says the Sūtra.

ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

ज्ञेयत्वावचनात् Because it is not mentioned (as something) to be known च and.

4. And because it is not mentioned (that the Avyakta) is to be known (it cannot be the Pradhâna of the Sâmkhyas).

Liberation, according to the Sâmkhyas, results when the difference between the Puruṣa and the Avyakta (Prakṛti) is known. Hence the Avyakta, with them, is to be known. But here there is no question of knowing

the Avyakta, and as such it cannot be the Pradhâna of the Sâmkhyas.

वदतीति चेत्, न, प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

वदति Does state इति चेत् if it be said न no प्राज्ञः intelligent Self हि for प्रकरणात् from the context.

5. If it be said (that the Śruti) does state (that the Avyakta has to be known and therefore it is the Pradhâna); (we say) no, for (it is) the intelligent (supreme) Self (which is meant), since that is the topic.

"He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch...beyond the Mahat (Great) and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death" (Ka. 1.3 15). The Sâmkhyas hold that in this text the Śruti says that the Pradhâna has to be known to attain Freedom; for the description given of the entity to be known tallies with the Pradhâna, which is also beyond the Mahat. The Sūtra refutes this saying that by Avyakta, the one beyond the Mahat (Great) etc., the intelligent (supreme) Self is meant, as that is the subject-matter of that section.

त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च ॥ ६ ॥

त्रयाणाम् Of three एव only च and एवम् thus उपन्यासः introduction प्रश्नः question च and.

6. And thus the question and elucidation with

reference to three only (of which the Pradhâna is not one) (is consistent).

In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, Naciketas asks Yama three questions only, viz. about the fire (sacrifice), the individual soul, and the supreme Self. The Pradhâna is not mentioned. So we cannot expect Yama to go out of his way and treat of the Pradhâna, which has not been inquired into

महद्वच्च ॥ ७ ॥

महद्वत् Like Mahat च and.

7. And like Mahat (the word 'Avyakta' does not refer to any Sāṃkhyan category).

The Mahat according to the Sāṃkhyas means the first-born, the cosmic intelligence; but in the Vedic texts it is associated with the word 'Self'. Passages like "The Mahat (Great) is superior to the intellect" (Ka. 1.3.10), clearly show that it is used in a different sense from the intellect and refer to the Self in different aspects. Similarly though the Avyakta in the Sāṃkhya philosophy may mean the Pradhâna or Prakṛti, in the Śruti texts it means something different. So the Pradhâna is not based on scriptural authority but is a mere inferred thing.

Topic 2: The tri-coloured Ajā of the Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣad is not the Sāṃkhyan Pradhâna.

In the last topic the opponent was refuted on the ground that the mere mention of the word 'Avyakta'

was not sufficient reason to identify it as the Sāṃkhyan category called the Pradhâna. The opponent here gives more analogies from the Śruti texts to uphold his view.

चमसवदविशेषात् ॥ ८ ॥

चमसवित् Like the bowl अविशेषात् for want of special characteristics.

8. (The word 'Ajā' cannot be asserted to mean the Pradhâna) for want of special characteristics, as in the case of the bowl.

"There is one Ajā, red, white, and black producing manifold offspring of the same appearance (colour)" (Śv. 4.5). The question is whether this 'Ajā' refers to the Sāṃkhya category Prakṛti or to the fine elements fire, water, and earth. The Sāṃkhyas hold that 'Ajā' here means the Pradhâna, the unborn; and red, white, and black refer to its three constituents, the Guṇas—Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. This Sūtra refutes this, saying that in the absence of special characteristics there is no basis for such a special assertion. The text can be interpreted otherwise also. "There is a bowl that has its opening below and bulging at the top" (Br. 2.2.3) It is impossible to decide from the text itself what kind of bowl is meant. So also it is impossible to fix the meaning of 'Ajā' from the text alone. As in the case of the bowl the complementary texts fix what kind of bowl is meant, so also here we have to refer this passage to supplementary scriptural texts to fix the meaning of 'Ajā' and not assert that it means the Pradhâna.

ज्योतिरूपक्रमा तु, तथा ह्यधीयत एके ॥ ९ ॥

ज्योतिरूपक्रमा (Elements) beginning with light but
तथा so हि because अधीयते read एके some.

9. But (the elements) beginning with light
(are meant by the word Ajâ), because some read
so.

The Chândogya assigns to the elements, fire, water,
and earth, created by the Lord, red, white, and black
colours. *Vide* Ch. 6.2.2-4 and 6.4.1.

This passage fixes the meaning of the word 'Ajâ'
here. It refers to the three elementary substances, *viz*
fire, earth, and water, from which the rest of the
creation has been produced. It is not the Prakṛti of the
Sāṃkhyas consisting of the three Guṇas. In the former
interpretation the three colours can be taken in their
primary sense, whereas they can represent the three
Guṇas in a secondary sense only. Moreover, the force
of the recognition of the Śruti is stronger; that is to say,
if we can beyond doubt recognize in this passage what
is elsewhere mentioned in the Śruti, that will be more
reasonable than to recognize categories of a Smṛti in
the Śruti texts

कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवदविरोधः ॥ १० ॥

कल्पनोपदेशात् Instruction having been given through
imagery च and मध्वादिवत् as in the case of 'honey' etc.
अविरोधः no incongruity.

10. And instruction having been given through

the imagery (of a goat) (there is) no incongruity,
(even) as in the case of 'honey' (standing for the
sun in Madhuvidyâ for the purpose of devout
meditation) and such other cases.

The word 'Ajâ' refers to something unborn; so how
can it refer to the three causal elements of the Chândo-
gya, which are something created? It is incongruous,
says the objector.

There is no incongruity in it, answers the Sûtra, as
the elements are spoken of through the imagery of a
she goat (Ajâ). Even as the sun in Madhuvidyâ is repre-
sented as honey in the text, "The sun indeed is the
honey" (Ch. 3.1.1), so also are the three elementary
substances of the Chândogya represented as the goat. A
she-goat may be black, white, and red, and may give
birth to offspring representing her in colour. Similarly
out of the combination of fire, water, and earth, having
red, white, and black colours respectively, are produced
all the inanimate and animate beings of similar colours.
The combination of the fine elements, fire, water, and
earth is here spoken of by the imagery of a tri-coloured
goat, and that is why it is called an Ajâ, which does not
however mean unborn.

*Topic 3 : The five-fold people of Br. 4.4.17
are not the twenty-five Sāṃkhyan categories.*

न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि, नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

न Not संख्योपसंग्रहादपि even from the statement of
the number नानाभावात् on account of the differences
अतिरेकात् on account of the excess च and.

11. Even from the statement of the number (five-fold five, *i.e.* twenty-five categories, by the Śruti, it is) not (to be presumed that the Śruti refers to the Pradhâna) on account of the differences (in the categories) and the excess (over the number of the Sâmkhyan categories).

“That in which the five groups of five and the (subtle) ether are placed, that very Ātman” etc. (Br. 4.4.17). Now five times five makes twenty-five, which is exactly the number of the Sâmkhyan categories. So the Sâmkhyas say that here is the scriptural authority for their philosophy. This Sûtra refutes such an assumption. For the Sâmkhyan categories cannot be divided into groups of five on any basis of similarity, for all the twenty-five categories differ from each other. Secondly, the mention of the ether in the text as a separate category would make the number twenty-six in all, contrary to the Sâmkhyan theory.

प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १२ ॥

प्राणादयः The vital force etc. वाक्यशेषात् because of the complementary passage.

12. (The five people referred to are) the vital force etc., because (we find it to be so) from the complementary passage.

“They who know the vital force of the vital force, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food, the mind of the mind,” etc. (Br. Mādhyandina recension 4.4.21). The ‘five people’ refer to this vital

force and the other four of the text, which are cited to describe Brahman.

ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने ॥ १३ ॥

ज्योतिषा By light एकेषाम् of some असति अन्ने food not being mentioned.

13. (In the text) of some (the Kânva recension) food not being mentioned (in the complementary passage referred to in the previous Sûtra), (the number is made up) by ‘light’ (mentioned in the previous verse).

“That immortal Light of lights the gods worship as longevity” (Br. 4.4.16). Though food is not mentioned in the text cited in the last Sûtra according to the Kânva recension of the Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa, yet the four of that verse, together with ‘light’ mentioned in the text cited above, would make the ‘five people’.

Topic 4: There is no contradiction in the scriptures as regards the fact that Brahman is the first Cause.

In the last three topics it has been shown that the Pradhâna of the Sâmkhyas is not based on the scriptures, and consequently it was established that all the Śruti texts refer to Brahman as the first Cause. The opponent now tries to show that as the Vedânta texts contradict each other with respect to the order of creation, they are therefore of doubtful import, and consequently it is safer to accept the Pradhâna, which is established by reason and inference, as the first Cause.

कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ॥ १४ ॥

कारणत्वेन As the (first) Cause च and आकाशादिषु as regards ether and so on यथा व्यपदिष्टोक्तेः being represented (in other texts) as taught (in one text).

14. (Although) as regards (things created, like ether and so on the Vedānta texts differ), (yet there is no such conflict with respect to Brahman) as the first Cause, (on account of Its) being represented (in other texts) as taught (in one text).

The Sāṃkhyas contend that though the Pradhāna cannot be the first Cause according to the Śruti, yet Brahman also cannot be taken to be the first Cause taught by the Śruti. Why? Because there is conflict as regards the order of creation; for some texts say that it is Ākāśa that was first produced from Brahman, some say that it is Prāṇa, others that it is fire. This Sūtra says that though there are conflicting views with respect to things created, that is, as regards the order of creation, yet since it is not the main object of the Śruti to teach about creation, it matters little. The main object in these descriptions is to teach that Brahman is the first Cause, and with respect to this there is no conflict; for every Vedānta text holds that Brahman is that.

समाकर्षात् ॥ १५ ॥

15. On account of the connection (with passage referring to Brahman, non-existence does not mean absolute non-existence).

A further objection is raised that even as regards

the first Cause there is a conflict, for some texts say that the Self created these worlds (Ai. Ā. 2.4.1.2-3), others say that creation originated from non-existence (Tai. 2.7). Again existence is taught as the first Cause in some texts (Ch. 6.2.1-2). Spontaneous creation also is taught by some texts (Br. 1.4.7). On account of these conflicting texts it cannot be said that all the Vedānta texts refer to Brahman uniformly as the first Cause. These objections are answered as follows: "This was indeed non-existence in the beginning" (Tai. 2.7). Non-existence here does not mean absolute non-existence but undifferentiated existence. Existence was at the beginning undifferentiated into name and form. In the texts of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad Brahman is definitely described as not being non-existence. "He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing is known by sages as existing" (Tai. 2.6). This Brahman is again described as having wished to be many and created this world. Again "How can that which is be created from non-existence?" (Ch. 6.2.2) clearly denies such a possibility. "Now this was then undifferentiated" (Br. 1.4.7), does not speak of spontaneous creation without a ruler, for it is connected with another passage where it is said, "He has entered here to the very tips of the finger-nails" (Br. 1.4.7), where 'He' refers to this ruler, and hence we have to take that the Lord, the ruler, developed what was undeveloped. Similarly Brahman, which is described in one place as existence, is referred to in another place as being the Self of all by the word 'Ātman' So all texts uniformly point to Brahman as the first Cause, and there is no conflict as regards this.

Topic 5: He who is the maker of the sun, moon, etc. is Brahman and not Prâna (the vital force) or the individual soul.

In the last topic the word 'existence' occurring in one passage helped us to interpret non-existence occurring in another passage as undifferentiated existence and not absolute non-existence. But the opponent now takes up for discussion texts where the words 'Prâna' etc. cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean Brahman, though it is mentioned in another text.

जगद्वाचित्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

जगत्-वाचित्वात् Because (it) denotes the world.

16. (He of whom all this is the work is Brahman) because (the work) denotes the world.

"He, O Bâlâki, who is the maker of these persons (whom you mentioned), and whose work this is—is alone to be known" (Kau. 4.19). In this section Bâlâki first describes the several individual souls residing in the sun, moon, ether, etc. as Brahman. Ajâtaśatru says that these are not the true Brahman and proceeding to teach the real Brahman says, "He who is the maker of these persons is alone to be known and not these persons." Here who is the maker of the sun, moon, etc. is the question. The opponent holds he is either the chief Prâna or the individual soul. He is the chief Prâna, for the activity of motion connected with work refers to Prâna, and Prâna is also mentioned in a complementary passage: "Then he becomes one

with that Prâna alone" (Kau. 4.20). It may also be the Jîva, for in—"As the master feeds with his people...thus does the conscious self feed with the other selves" (Kau. 4.20) it is referred to. The Sûtra refutes all this and says it is Brahman that is referred to by 'maker' in the text; for Brahman is taught here. "I shall teach you Brahman." Again 'this', which means the world, is his work—which clearly points out that the 'he' is none other than Brahman. Therefore the maker is neither Prâna nor the individual soul, but the supreme Lord.

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्, तद्व्याख्यातम् ॥ १७ ॥

जीव-मुख्यप्राण-लिङ्गात् On account of characteristics of the individual soul and the chief Prâna न not इति चेत् if it be said तत् that व्याख्यातम् has already been explained.

17. If it be said that on account of the characteristics of the individual soul and the chief Prâna (to be found in the text, Brahman is) not (referred to by the word 'maker' in the passage cited), (we reply) that has already been explained.

See note on 1.1.31.

अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके ॥ १८ ॥

अन्यार्थं For another purpose तु but जैमिनिः Jaimini प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्याम् because of the question and elucidation अपि च moreover एवम thus एके some.

18. But (the sage) Jaimini (thinks that the reference to the individual soul in the text) has another purpose because of the question and answer; moreover thus some (the Vâjasaneyins) (read in their recension).

Even the reference to the individual soul in the said chapter of the Kauṣîtakī Upaniṣad has a different purpose, and that is not to propound the individual soul but Brahman by showing that the individual soul is different from Brahman. The questions, "Where did the person thus sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?" (Kau. 4.19) refer clearly to something different from the individual soul. And so does the answer (*Ibid.* 4.20) say that the individual soul is merged in Brahman in deep sleep. The Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad, where also this conversation occurs, clearly points out the individual soul by the term 'Vijñānamaya', the person consisting of cognition, and distinguishes it from the supreme Self (Br 2.1.16-17).

Topic 6: The Self to be seen through hearing etc. is Brahman.

In the last topic the text under discussion was interpreted to refer to Brahman, because the section begins with Brahman: "I will teach you Brahman." Following the same argument the opponent cites Br. 2.4.5 and argues that since the section begins with the individual soul, the self to be seen referred to in this text is the individual soul and not Brahman.

वाक्यान्वयात् ॥ १६ ॥

वाक्य-अन्वयात् On account of the connected meaning of passages.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, etc. is Brahman) on account of the connected meaning of the passages.

"The Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realized—should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. By the realization of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection, and meditation, all this is known" (Br 2.4.5). In this passage the supreme Self is referred to, and not the individual soul. Why? In the whole section Brahman is treated. It begins with Maitreyī's question "Will wealth get me immortality?" and Yājñavalkya answers that wealth, sacrifice, etc. will not obtain that immortality. She then asks for that which will give her immortality, and Yājñavalkya teaches her the knowledge of the Self; finally the section concludes with, "Thus far goes immortality". Now immortality cannot be gained by the knowledge of the individual soul, but only by the knowledge of the supreme Self or Brahman. Therefore Brahman alone is the subject-matter and It alone is to be seen through hearing etc. Moreover, the text quoted says that by the knowledge of the Self spoken of there, everything is known, which clearly connects the Self referred to with Brahman; for how can the knowledge of a limited individual self give us knowledge of everything?

प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेल्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ॥ २० ॥

प्रतिज्ञा-सिद्धेः Of the proof of the proposition लिङ्गम्
indicatory mark आश्मरथ्यः Āśmarathya.

20. (The fact that the individual soul is

taught as the object of realization is an) indicatory mark (which is) proof of the proposition, so Āśmarathya thinks.

In this Sūtra the text quoted in the last Sūtra (Br. 2.4.5.) is interpreted from the standpoint of Bhedābheda-vāda of sage Āśmarathya. According to this school the individual soul (Jīva) and Brahman, which are related as effect and cause respectively, are different, yet not different, from each other, even as sparks are different, yet not different from fire. If the individual soul (Jīva) were quite different from Brahman, then by the knowledge of the one (Brahman) everything else would not be known. Hence this school interprets the text thus: The individual soul alone is to be seen. But as it is not different from Brahman, the knowledge of the individual soul gives knowledge of Brahman and consequently knowledge of everything. It is this non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul (Jīva) that establishes the proposition, "By the knowledge of one everything else is known", and in this sense alone the text speaks of the individual soul in Br. 2.4.5..

It can also be interpreted as follows. If the individual soul is something different from Brahman, then the knowledge of Brahman would not give the knowledge of the individual soul. Therefore the individual soul is different, yet not different, from Brahman. It is to show this that the Śruti text begins with the individual soul.

उत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादित्यौडुलोमिः ॥ २१ ॥

उत्क्रमिष्यतः Of the one which rises from the body

एवंभावात् because of this nature इति thus औडुलोमिः (the sage) Auḍulomi.

21. (The statement at the beginning identifies the individual soul with Brahman) because of this nature (*viz.* its identity with Brahman) of the one (*i.e.* the soul) which rises from the body (at the time of release), thus (thinks) Auḍulomi.

This Ācārya, while taking that the self to be seen is the individual soul (Jīva), explains it as follows: The soul, when it rises from the body, *i.e.* is free and has no body consciousness, realizes that it is identical with Brahman. It is to show this non-difference in the state of release that the Śruti speaks of the individual soul as identical with Brahman, even though the difference between the individual soul (Jīva) and Brahman in the state of ignorance is a reality. It is spoken of as non-different from the supreme Self or Brahman because in the state of release it is one with It. The text transfers the future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. This school of Vedānta is known as Satya-bheda-vāda (*i.e.* the theory which holds that the difference between the individual soul and Brahman is a reality).

अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥ २२ ॥

अवस्थितेः Because of the existence इति so holds काशकृत्स्नः Kāśakrtsna.

22. (The initial statement is made) because

of the existence (of Brahman as the individual soul), so holds (sage) Kāśakṛtsna.

As it is impossible that an individual soul (Jīva) quite different in nature from Brahman can be one with it in the state of release, this sage thinks that the supreme Self Itself exists as the individual soul. They are absolutely non-different, the apparent difference being due to Upādhis or limiting adjuncts, which are but products of ignorance, and therefore unreal from the absolute standpoint. Hence also follows that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else is known.

Of the three schools of Vedānta depicted in the last three Sūtras, that of Kāśakṛtsna is justified by the Vedānta texts. According to Āśmarathya the individual soul is a product of the supreme Self, and hence the knowledge of the cause leads to the knowledge of everything including the individual soul. But is the effect or any portion of it different from the cause? And is the whole cause involved in each of its effects? The answer to the second question is evidently, no. If the effect or some portion of it is different from this cause, whence does it come? And is it separable from that? If separable, it is not its nature, for nature cannot be separated. If not separable, the cause cannot be known, and the proposition, "The soul being known, all else is known", falls to the ground. So Āśmarathya's view cannot stand.

According to Auḍulomi the individual soul (Jīva) is only a state of the supreme Self. If the Jīvahood is a reality, it can never be destroyed and freedom would be impossible. If on the other hand it becomes one with the supreme Soul on release, then there is nothing like Jīvahood which can be a reality. So Auḍulomi's

view cannot stand. Jīvahood is an unreality, a creation of ignorance, the Jīva being identical with Brahman. Even the creation of Jīvas like sparks issuing from a fire does not speak of any real creation but only with reference to Upādhis. In reality the Jīva is neither created nor destroyed. It is our ignorance that makes us see the individual soul (Jīva) limited by Upādhis as something different from Brahman.

Topic 7: Brahman is also the material cause of the world.

प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥ २३ ॥

प्रकृतिः Material cause च also प्रतिज्ञा-दृष्टान्त-अनुपरोधात् not being contradictory to the proposition and illustrations.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, (on account of this view alone) not being contradictory to the proposition and the illustration (cited in the Śruti).

Granted that Brahman is the cause of the world; but what kind of cause? Is It the efficient cause, or the material cause, or both? The *prima facie* view is that Brahman is only the efficient cause, as texts like "He thought, ... he created Prāna (Pr. 6.3-4) declare.

This view is refuted by this Sūtra. Brahman is also the material cause of the world. Here 'also' shows that it is the efficient cause as well. It is only if Brahman is the material cause of the world that it is possible to know everything through the knowledge of Brahman,