Chapter 10.\u00a0 Accuracy: Historical, Political, and Conceptual Objections<\/p>\n
Abstract<\/p>\n
This chapter reviews many of the reasons why accuracy is a controversial topic in social psychology.\u00a0 The historical interest in accuracy is briefly reviewed, as are some older reviews from the 1950s that, for 30 years, essentially killed accuracy research.\u00a0 Modern theoretical and political sources of objections to accuracy research are identified.\u00a0 These objections are themselves critically evaluated, and, in general, are found to be more flawed than the accuracy research to which they object.\u00a0 Although some criticisms of accuracy research are well-justified, none justify the claims (that have sometimes appeared) suggesting that accuracy research cannot or should not be conducted.<\/p>\n
EXCERPT:<\/i><\/b>
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Consider also the following from Fiske (1998, Page 381 (commenting on McCauley, et al’s [1995] chapter on stereotype accuracy):
\nMoreover, they differ from the present review in their conclusions, which do not follow from their premises:\u00a0 If two resumes are otherwise equivalent, it is permissible to use stereotypes associated with group membership as a factor in hiring choice, if group membership has previously predicted success on the job.\u00a0 (In this they evidently disagree with U.S. civil rights law).”
\n\u201cPermissible\u201d!?\u00a0 We (I am one of the \u201cet al\u201d) made claims about accuracy, not about \u201cpermissibility.\u201d\u00a0 These are clear political rationales for quashing accuracy research.\u00a0 Fiske does not criticize accuracy research as failing to demonstrate that relying on stereotypes increases accuracy of predictions.\u00a0 Instead, she criticizes such research on grounds of the “permissibility” of relying on stereotypes.\u00a0 People in power make decisions about permissibility.\u00a0 I have never seen permissibility presented as a criterion for establishing the accuracy of judgments and it is not included as one in this book.
\nOnce the permissibility criterion is established, however, it has liberated Fiske (1998) to completely ignore our claim that relying on stereotypes sometimes increases the accuracy of judgments.\u00a0 Instead, she relies on two classic logical fallacies to make her point.\u00a0 First, she makes the \u201cred herring\u201d type of argument \u2013 being that she does not even attempt to refute the point that relying on stereotypes sometimes does increase accuracy, she changes the subject \u2013 to the politics of permissibility. She claims we disagree with civil rights law, even though our paper never discussed civil rights law or any other law.\u00a0 This also takes advantage of a second classic logical fallacy: the ad hominem attack.\u00a0 After all, who disagrees with civil rights laws except bigots?\u00a0 And we can\u2019t believe anything a bigot says, can we?\u00a0 By implicitly insinuating political issues into the topic, Fiske\u2019s quote is a masterful piece of misdirection, denigration and dismissal that is likely to appear compellingly convincing to many of those sympathetic to her goals.\u00a0 But it is irrelevant to helping figure out whether and when relying on a stereotype increases or reduces accuracy.
\nRegardless of who agrees or disagrees with civil rights law, this is a fundamentally political, not scientific, rationale for quashing accuracy work.\u00a0 Fiske (1998) presents neither evidence nor argument that relying on group membership necessarily reduces the accuracy of perceivers’ judgments of individual targets.\u00a0 I submit that that is because she cannot do so, although to fully understand why, you will have to read Chapter 18 (if you are generally interested in the issue of accuracy and inaccuracy in stereotypes, you should read Chapters 15-19).\u00a0 <\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"