Chapter 15. On the Pervasiveness and Logical Incoherence of Defining Stereotypes as Inaccurate<\/p>\n
Abstract<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 This chapter defines stereotypes.\u00a0 Part of doing so involves explaining why stereotypes should not (indeed, logically, cannot) be defined as inaccurate. This claim is so controversial that the chapter begins by considering whether it is immoral to even suggest that stereotypes might not be inaccurate.\u00a0\u00a0 This chapter concludes that it is both scientifically and politically irresponsible to suggest that social beliefs (including stereotypes) are inaccurate, when, in fact, those beliefs are accurate.\u00a0 Next, definitions that presume stereotype inaccuracy are considered.\u00a0 All such definitions are found to be scientifically dysfunctional either because they are logically incoherent or because they would lead to the dismissal as irrelevant nearly all social science research that has addressed stereotypes.\u00a0 A discussion then follows demonstrating numerous situations in which social scientists take for granted the reality of group differences and accuracy in perceiving them.\u00a0 This is one type of incoherence: Social scientists do not have the option of defining beliefs about groups as inaccurate and then treating their own beliefs about groups as accurate. The chapter speculates that socio-political motives (promoting one\u2019s self as an unbigoted egalitarian; expressing concern for inequality) create the social pressure that has sustained such problematic definitions.\u00a0 The chapter also points out that many perspectives providing a seemingly neutral definition of stereotypes (ones that do not define stereotypes as inaccurate), often re-import an emphasis on inaccuracy through the \u201cback door\u201d \u2013 by relentlessly emphasizing stereotypes\u2019 inaccuracy upon further discussion.\u00a0 The chapter concludes by providing a truly neutral definition of stereotypes (allowing them to be accurate or inaccurate) and by emphasizing the scientific benefits of a genuinely neutral definition, without backdoor distortions.<\/p>\n
EXCERPT:<\/i><\/b>
\nThe Acceptance of Group Differences II: Known Groups Validity
\n\u201cValidity,\u201d in the scientific literature, is a close sibling of \u201caccuracy.\u201d\u00a0 \u201cValid\u201d conclusions are those well-justified and believable.\u00a0 \u201cValid\u201d measurements succeed at measuring what they are supposed to measure.\u00a0 So, if measure X indicates that Fred has high self-esteem, if it is valid, Fred most likely really does have high self-esteem.
\nIssues of validity can come up anytime, but most often explicitly come up in psychology when researchers develop new measuring instruments.\u00a0 How do we know that Dr. Smith\u2019s new self-report scale measuring \u201cmotivation to watch TV sitcoms\u201d actually measures motivation to watch sitcoms?\u00a0 It doesn\u2019t just because he says so.\u00a0 He needs some sort of evidence.\u00a0 Although a review of all the types of validity evidence is beyond the scope of this chapter, one type in particular, is very relevant.
\n\u201cKnown-groups\u201d validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979) refers to validating a new questionnaire by administering it to groups who would be well-known to differ on the measure, if it really measured what it is supposed to measure.\u00a0 For example, let\u2019s say we could identify two groups of people: one group who watches 20 hours of sitcoms a week and another who never watch sitcoms.\u00a0 If Dr. Smith\u2019s measure is valid, the first group should score higher on Motivation to Watch Sitcoms than the second group.
\nValidity \u2013 one of the core, essential ingredients for any psychological research \u2013 takes for granted that groups differ in many ways, and uses that knowledge in the service of advancing science.\u00a0 To use several examples more relevant to stereotypes than my sitcom one, on average, Whites should show more anti-Black prejudice on all sorts of measures than do African-Americans; Catholic priests should score higher on measures of religiosity than do atheists; and conservatives should score higher on measures of right wing authoritarianism than do liberals.\u00a0 In this context, it is, apparently, not merely moral to believe that groups differ, but assumed and exploited by competent psychological scientists seeking to develop new instruments.\u00a0 If exploiting \u201cknown\u201d group differences is part of normal science, then \u201cknowing\u201d that groups differ (i.e., stereotyping them) cannot possibly be inherently immoral or necessarily flawed.<\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"