CV
Curriculum Vitae
Richard Patrick. McLean
Address:
Department of Economics
Rutgers University
New Jersey Hall
75 Hamilton Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248
rpmclean@economics.rutgers.edu
Current Position:
Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, 1992-present
Past Positions:
Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, 1990-1992
Assistant Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, 1986-1990
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1980-1986
Postdoctoral Fellow, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics,
Yale University, 1979-1980
Other Visiting Positions:
Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Sept-Dec, 1990
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Sept-Dec, 1995
Consulting Positions:
Visiting Member of the Technical Staff, Bell Communications Research, 1992-
1997
Education:
B.S., Dept of Mathematics, Penn State University, 1974
M.S., Dept of Applied Mathematics, SUNY Stony Brook, 1976
Ph.D., SUNY Stony Brook, 1979
Dissertation: A Synthesis of Discrete and Continuous Location Problems: Valid Inequalities for the Quadratic Assignment Problem
Honors and Awards
Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (2011)
Editorships
Section Editor-in-Chief, Games, 2022-ongoing
Associate Editorships:
Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 2002-2024
Associate Editor, Economics Bulletin, 2003-2018
Associate Editor, Economic Theory, 2006-ongoing
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory, 2006-2020
Associate Editor, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011-2020
Associate Editor, Economic theory Bulletin, 2013-ongoing
Associate Editor, Games, 2020-2022
Plenary and Keynote Conference Presentations
Aumann-Shapley Prices and Broadband Telecommunications Pricing, Conference on Telecommunications Pricing, Boca Raton Florida, 1992
Aumann-Shapley Prices: New Developments and Applications, NATO Advanced Study Institute on Game Theory: The Axiomatic Approach, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 1997
Potential Weighted Values of Non-Atomic Games, Workshop on Non-Atomic Games and their Applications, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 1998
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty, Conference of the Society for Economic Design, New York University, July, 2002
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Games 2004, the International Conference of the Game Theory Society, Marseille, France, July, 2004
Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information, Conference on Recent Trends in Cooperative Game Theory, CIMAT: The National Center for Applied Mathematics, Guanajuato, Mexico, January, 2005
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Workshop on Uncertainty and Information, Institute for the Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore, June, 2005
Game Theoretic Models in Cyberdeterrence, Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options, The National Academies, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Washington, DC, June, 2010.
Mechanism Design and Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring, Shanghai Workshop in Microeconomic Theory, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, June, 2010
The Full Extraction problem: Recent Results, Economic Theory Conference, University of Toulouse, June, 2016
Equilibria in Discontinuous Games without Transitivity, Microeconomic Theory Mini-Conference, University of Arizona, May, 2017.
A Folk theorem for Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring, China Meetings of the Econometric Society, Wuhan China, June, 2017
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games with Intransitivities, The 9th York Symposium on Game Theory, University of York, England, June 2018,
A Folk theorem for Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring, Summer Workshop in Economic Theory, SWET 18, June, 2018, Paris, France
Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Conference on Mechanism Design, Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore, July, 2018
Game Theoretic Proofs of some Set Intersection Theorems, Notre Dame Economic Theory Conference, April, 2025
Invited Lectures and Seminar Presentations (domestic, 2000 – present)
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility, Economic Theory workshop, Yale University, March, 2002
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Economic Theory workshop, University of Rochester, October, 2002
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Economic Theory workshop, MEDS Northwestern, November, 2002
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Economic Theory workshop, Washington University of St .Louis, April, 2003
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Economic Theory workshop, University of Pennsylvania, April, 2003
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Economic Theory workshop, Texas A&M, February, 2004
Informational Size and Implementation with Incomplete Information, Economic Theory workshop, University of Michigan, September, 2004
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, Princeton University, April, 2006
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, University of Illinois, April, 2006
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, Rice University, November, 2007
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, Texas A&M University, November, 2007
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, Johns Hopkins University, February, 2009
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, Johns Hopkins University, February, 2009
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information with Discontinuous Payoffs, Economic Theory Seminar, Johns Hopkins University, October, 2014
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information with Discontinuous Payoffs, Economic Theory Seminar, University of Arizona, April, 2016
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games with Intransitivities, Economic Theory Seminar, University of Iowa, April, 2016
Equilibria in Discontinuous Games without Transitivity, Micreoconomic Theory Seminar, Brown University, April, 2017.
Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Economic Theory Seminar, University of Central Florida, February, 2019
Invited Lectures and Seminar Presentations (International, 2000 – present)
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory Seminar, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India, August, 2005
Aggregation of Expert Opinions, Economic Theory workshop, University of Montreal, April, 2008
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Economic Theory workshop, ITAM, January, 2009
Mechanism Design and Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring, Economic Theory Seminar, University of Warwick, England, April, 2012
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information with Discontinuous Payoffs, Economic Theory Seminar, ITAM, September, 2013
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information with Discontinuous Payoffs, Economic Theory Seminar, Ryerson University, December, 2013
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information with Discontinuous Payoffs, Economic Theory Seminar, University of Montreal, April, 2015
Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, August, 2016
Discontinuous Quasi-Variational Relations and Applications, Economic Theory Seminar, Hong King Baptist University, Hong Kong, China, April, 2019.
Discontinuous Quasi-Variational Relations and Applications, Economic Theory Seminar, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China, April, 2019
Other Conference Presentations (2000 – present)
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information, International Conference on Game theory, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 2000
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring, International Conference on Game theory, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 2001
Auctions with Interdependent Valuations, International Conference on Game Theory, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 2002
Axiomatic Foundations for Compromise Theory, Public Economic Theory Conference, Galway, Ireland, June, 2009
Equilibrium Refinements for Discontinuous Potential Games, 13th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Paris, France, July 2013
Equilibria in Discontinuous Games without Transitivity, 15th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Cambridge, England, July 2015.
A Two-Stage Implementation Game with Interdependent Values, 16th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, IMPA, Brazil, July 2016.
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games, 17th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Faro, Portugal, June, 2017.
Discontinuous Quasi-Variational Relations, 19th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Ischia, Italy, July, 2019.
Existence of Equilibrium in Generalized games without Compact Strategy Sets, 22th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Canberra, Australia, July, 2022.
Mechanism Design for Assignment Problems with Two sided Asymmetric Information, 22th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Canberra, Australia, July, 2022.
A Hybrid Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Qualitative and Generalized Games, 23rd Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Paris, France, July, 2023
Professional Activities
Journal Referee
Referee for Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, International Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Operations Research, Mathematics of Operations Research, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Annals of Operations Research, Mathematical Social Sciences, Economic Theory, European Journal of Operations Research, Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, Journal of Global Optimization, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
Referee for the National Science Foundation
Referee for the Israel Science Foundation
Conference Organizer:
Organizer, DIMACS Conference on Economics, Game Theory and the Internet, Rutgers University, April, 1997
Organizer, The Shapley Value at 50, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 2003
Organizer, DIMACS Workshop on Game Theory and Bounded Rationality, February, 2005
Scientific Organizer, International Conference on Game Theory and its Applications, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 2007
Organizer for Penn Economic Theory Conference, University of Pennsylvania, October, 2008
Conference Program Committees
Program Committee, 13th Conference of the Society for the advancement of Economic Theory, Paris, France, July 2013
Program Committee, 17th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Faro, Portugal, June, 2017.
Program Committee, 23rd Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Paris, France, July, 2023
Conference Session Organizing:
Organizing Committee, SED 2002 Conference, New York University, July, 2002
Session Organizer on “Discontinuous Games”, 13th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Paris, France, July 2013
Session Organizer on “Game Theory”, 15th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Cambridge, England, July 2015
Session Organizer on “Game Theory”, 16th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, IMPA, Brazil, July 2016
Session Organizer on “Topics in Games Theory”, 17th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Faro, Portugal, June, 2017.
Session Organizer on “Topics in Games Theory”, 19th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Ischia, Italy, July, 2019.
Session Organizer on “Topics in Games Theory” and “Topics in Mathematical Economics”, 22th Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Canberra, Australia, July, 2022.
Session Organizer, “Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics”, 23rd Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Paris, France, July, 2023
Session Organizer, “Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics”, 23rd Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Ischia, Italy , July, 2025
Publications:
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent, with J. Cremer, Econometrica, 53(1985), 345-362
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica, with J. Cremer, 56(1988), 1247-1257.
Industry Structure with Sequential Technology Choice, with M. Riordan, Journal of Economic Theory, 47(1989), 1-21.
Excess Functions and Nucleolus Allocations of Pure Exchange Economies, Games and Economic Behavior, with A. Postlewaite, 1(1989), 131-143.
Weighted Coalition Structure Values, with A. Levy, Games and Economic Behavior, 1(1989), 234-249.
Subjective Evaluations of n-Person Games, with D. Blair, Journal of Economic Theory, 50(1990), 346-361.
An Axiomatization of the Weighted NTU Value, with A. Levy, International Journal of Game Theory, 19(1991), 339-351.
Random Order Coalition Structure Values, International Journal of Game Theory, 20(1991), 109-127.
An Axiomatic Characterization of the Reliability Polynomial, with D. Blair, in Reliability of Computer and Communication Networks, DIMACS Series on Discrete Mathematics and Computer Science Vol. 5, Roberts et al., eds, American Mathematical Society, 1991.
Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games, with L. Billera, in Cooperative Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Michael Maschler, Nimrod Megiddo, ed., Springer Verlag, 1992.
The Compromise Value for NTU Games, with P. Borm, H. Keiding and S.Tijs, International Journal of Game Theory, 21(1992), 175-189.
Approximation Theory for Stochastic Variational Inequalities and Ky Fan Inequalities in finite Dimensions, Annals of Operations Research, 44(1993), 43-61.
An Approach to Broadband Telecommunications Pricing, with W. Sharkey, Telecommunications Systems, 2(1993), 159-184.
Probabilistic Value Pricing, with W. Sharkey, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, (43)1996, 73-95.
Reference Functions and Possibility Theorems for Cardinal Social Choice Problems, with J. Conley and S.Wilkie, Social Choice and Welfare, 14(1996), 65-78.
Weighted Aumann-Shapley Pricing, with W. Sharkey, International Journal of Game Theory, (27)1998, 511-523.
Alternative Methods for Cost allocation in stochastic Service Systems, (with W. Sharkey), Brazilian electronic Journal of Economics, vol. 1(1)
Coalition Structure Values of Mixed Games, in Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, M. Wooders ed., Fields Institute of Mathematics, 1999.
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (with A. Postlewaite), Econometrica, 70(2002), 2421-2454.
Values of NTU Games, in The Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3, R.Aumann and S. Hart, Eds, North Holland , 2002.
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (with A. Postlewaite), Review of Economic Studies, 71(2004), 809-82.
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty (with A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2003), 410-433.
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information (with A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 45(2003), 222-241.
Potential, Consistency and Cost Allocation Prices (with A. Pazgal and W. Sharkey), Mathematics of Operations Research, 29(2004), 602-623.
Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information (with A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 50(2005), 58-78.
Auction Form Preference and Efficiency of Asymmetric Discriminatory Auctions (with C. Campbell and O. Carare), Economics Letters, 86(2005), 95-100.
Aggregation of Expert Opinions, (with D. Gerardi and A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2009), 339-371.
Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution (with Voorneveld M, A van den Nouweland), International Journal of Game Theory, 40(2011), 427-448.
Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement, (with O. Carbonell), Economic Theory, 54(2013), 1-26.
Refinements of Nash Equilibrium for Potential Games (with O. Carbonell), Theoretical Economics, 9(2014), 555-582.
Robustness of Public Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (with I.Obara and A. Postlewaite), Journal of Economic Theory, 153(2014), 191-212.
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, (with A. Postlewaite), Theoretical Economics, 10(2015), 923-952.
On equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games (with O. Carbonell), International Journal of Game Theory, 44(2015), 869-890.
A Dynamic non-Direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdeprendent Value Problems (with A.Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 101 (2017), 34-48.
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information Discontinuous Payoffs, (with O. Carbonell), Mathematics of Operations Research, 43(2018),100-129.
Nash and Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Strategic Form Games with Intransitivities,(with O.Carbonell), Economic Theory, 68(2019), 935-965
Discontinuous Quasi-Variational Relations and Applications, Pure and Applied Functional Analysis, 6(2021), 817-834
The KKM lemma and the Fan-Browder theorems: Equivalences and some circular tours, (with M.A. Khan and M. Uyanik), Linear and Non- Linear Analysis, 7(2021), 33-62.
An Assignment problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities, (with T. Daddario and A. Postlewaite, Economic Theory, 78(2024), 567–592.
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication, (with I.Obara and A. Postlewaite), Economic Theory, Online First, March 2024.
On Equilibria in Constrained Generalized Games with the Weak Continuous Inclusion Property: An Application of Himmelberg’s Fixed Point Theorem, (with M.A. Khan and M.Uyanik), Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 537(2024)
On Equilibria in Constrained Generalized Games on Non-locally Convex and Non-Hausdorff Topological Vector Spaces (with M. Ali Khan and Metin Uyanik), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 111(2024)
Excess Demand Approach with Non-Convexity and Discontinuity: A Generalization of the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu Lemma (with M.A. Khan and M.Uyanik), Economic Theory, Online First, March 2025.
Alternative Proofs of the GNKD and KKMS Lemmas: A Game Theoretic Underpinning, (with M.A. Khan and M.Uyanik), Economic Theory Bulletin, (13)2025, 1 – 20
Information Requirements for Mechanism Design, (with A. Postlewaite), Journal of Economic theory, online first, July, 2025
Book Reviews:
“Submodular functions and optimization theory” by S. Fujishige, reviewed (with W.Sharkey) in Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 29 (1993), 98-104.
Administrative Activities
Department:
Graduate Curriculum Committee, 1986-2024
Graduate Admissions Committee, 1995-2024
Graduate Examination Committee, 1986-2024
Graduate Placement Coordinator, 1995-2015
Micro Theory Workshop, 1986-ongoing
Director of Graduate Studies, 2002-2006, 2019-2022
Masters in Economics Committee, 2024-ongoing
University Committees:
A&P Committee, 2000-2010, 2012, 2013, 2024
SAS Graduate Executive Committee, 2019-2022
SAS Graduate Academic Cluster Committee, 2023-ongoing