Publications
Publications:
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent, with J. Cremer, Econometrica, 53(1985), 345-362
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica, with J. Cremer, 56(1988), 1247-1257.
Industry Structure with Sequential Technology Choice, with M. Riordan, Journal of Economic Theory, 47(1989), 1-21.
Excess Functions and Nucleolus Allocations of Pure Exchange Economies, Games and Economic Behavior, with A. Postlewaite, 1(1989), 131-143.
Weighted Coalition Structure Values, with A. Levy, Games and Economic Behavior, 1(1989), 234-249.
Subjective Evaluations of n-Person Games, with D. Blair, Journal of Economic Theory, 50(1990), 346-361.
An Axiomatization of the Weighted NTU Value, with A. Levy, International Journal of Game Theory, 19(1991), 339-351.
Random Order Coalition Structure Values, International Journal of Game Theory, 20(1991), 109-127.
An Axiomatic Characterization of the Reliability Polynomial, with D. Blair, in Reliability of Computer and Communication Networks, DIMACS Series on Discrete Mathematics and Computer Science Vol. 5, Roberts et al., eds, American Mathematical Society, 1991.
Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games, with L. Billera, in Cooperative Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Michael Maschler, Nimrod Megiddo, ed., Springer Verlag, 1992.
The Compromise Value for NTU Games, with P. Borm, H. Keiding and S.Tijs, International Journal of Game Theory, 21(1992), 175-189.
Approximation Theory for Stochastic Variational Inequalities and Ky Fan Inequalities in finite Dimensions, Annals of Operations Research, 44(1993), 43-61.
An Approach to Broadband Telecommunications Pricing, with W. Sharkey, Telecommunications Systems, 2(1993), 159-184.
Probabilistic Value Pricing, with W. Sharkey, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, (43)1996, 73-95.
Reference Functions and Possibility Theorems for Cardinal Social Choice Problems, with J. Conley and S.Wilkie, Social Choice and Welfare, 14(1996), 65-78.
Weighted Aumann-Shapley Pricing, with W. Sharkey, International Journal of Game Theory, (27)1998, 511-523.
Alternative Methods for Cost allocation in stochastic Service Systems, (with W. Sharkey), Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, vol. 1(1)
Coalition Structure Values of Mixed Games, in Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, M. Wooders ed., Fields Institute of Mathematics, 1999.
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (with A. Postlewaite), Econometrica, 70(2002), 2421-2454.
Values of NTU Games, in The Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3, R.Aumann and S. Hart, Eds, North Holland , 2002.
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (with A. Postlewaite), Review of Economic Studies, 71(2004), 809-82.
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty (with A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2003), 410-433.
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information (with A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 45(2003), 222-241.
Potential, Consistency and Cost Allocation Prices (with A. Pazgal and W. Sharkey), Mathematics of Operations Research, 29(2004), 602-623.
Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information (with A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 50(2005), 58-78.
Auction Form Preference and Efficiency of Asymmetric Discriminatory Auctions (with C. Campbell and O. Carare), Economics Letters, 86(2005), 95-100.
Aggregation of Expert Opinions, (with D. Gerardi and A. Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2009), 339-371.
Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution (with Voorneveld M, A van den Nouweland), International Journal of Game Theory, 40(2011), 427-448.
Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement, (with O. Carbonell), Economic Theory, 54(2013), 1-26.
Refinements of Nash Equilibrium for Potential Games (with O. Carbonell), Theoretical Economics, 9(2014), 555-582.
Robustness of Public Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (with I.Obara and A. Postlewaite), Journal of Economic Theory, 153(2014), 191-212.
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, (with A. Postlewaite), Theoretical Economics, 10(2015), 923-952.
On equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games (with O. Carbonell), International Journal of Game Theory, 44(2015), 869-890.
A Dynamic non-Direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdeprendent Value Problems (with A.Postlewaite), Games and Economic Behavior, 101 (2017), 34-48.
The Existence of Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information Discontinuous Payoffs, (with O. Carbonell), Mathematics of Operations Research, 43(2018),100-129.
Nash and Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Strategic Form Games with Intransitivities,(with O.Carbonell), Economic Theory, 68(2019), 935-965
Discontinuous Quasi-Variational Relations and Applications, Pure and Applied Functional Analysis, 6(2021), 817-834
The KKM lemma and the Fan-Browder theorems: Equivalences and some circular tours, (with M.A. Khan and M. Uyanik), Linear and Non- Linear Analysis, 7(2021), 33-62.
An Assignment problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities, (with T. Daddario and A. Postlewaite, Economic Theory, 78(2024), 567–592.
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication, (with I.Obara and A. Postlewaite), Economic Theory, Online First, March 2024.
On Equilibria in Constrained Generalized Games with the Weak Continuous Inclusion Property: An Application of Himmelberg’s Fixed Point Theorem, (with M.A. Khan and M.Uyanik), Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 537(2024)
On Equilibria in Constrained Generalized Games on Non-locally Convex and Non-Hausdorff Topological Vector Spaces (with M. Ali Khan and Metin Uyanik), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 111(2024)
Excess Demand Approach with Non-Convexity and Discontinuity: A Generalization of the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu Lemma (with M.A. Khan and M.Uyanik), Economic Theory, Online First, March 2025.
Alternative Proofs of the GNKD and KKMS Lemmas: A Game Theoretic Underpinning, (with M.A. Khan and M.Uyanik), Economic Theory Bulletin, (13)2025, 1 – 20
Information Requirements for Mechanism Design, (with A. Postlewaite), Journal of Economic theory, online first, July, 2025