Chapter 15. On the Pervasiveness and Logical Incoherence of Defining Stereotypes as Inaccurate

Abstract

    This chapter defines stereotypes.  Part of doing so involves explaining why stereotypes should not (indeed, logically, cannot) be defined as inaccurate. This claim is so controversial that the chapter begins by considering whether it is immoral to even suggest that stereotypes might not be inaccurate.   This chapter concludes that it is both scientifically and politically irresponsible to suggest that social beliefs (including stereotypes) are inaccurate, when, in fact, those beliefs are accurate.  Next, definitions that presume stereotype inaccuracy are considered.  All such definitions are found to be scientifically dysfunctional either because they are logically incoherent or because they would lead to the dismissal as irrelevant nearly all social science research that has addressed stereotypes.  A discussion then follows demonstrating numerous situations in which social scientists take for granted the reality of group differences and accuracy in perceiving them.  This is one type of incoherence: Social scientists do not have the option of defining beliefs about groups as inaccurate and then treating their own beliefs about groups as accurate. The chapter speculates that socio-political motives (promoting one’s self as an unbigoted egalitarian; expressing concern for inequality) create the social pressure that has sustained such problematic definitions.  The chapter also points out that many perspectives providing a seemingly neutral definition of stereotypes (ones that do not define stereotypes as inaccurate), often re-import an emphasis on inaccuracy through the “back door” – by relentlessly emphasizing stereotypes’ inaccuracy upon further discussion.  The chapter concludes by providing a truly neutral definition of stereotypes (allowing them to be accurate or inaccurate) and by emphasizing the scientific benefits of a genuinely neutral definition, without backdoor distortions.

EXCERPT:
The Acceptance of Group Differences II: Known Groups Validity
“Validity,” in the scientific literature, is a close sibling of “accuracy.”  “Valid” conclusions are those well-justified and believable.  “Valid” measurements succeed at measuring what they are supposed to measure.  So, if measure X indicates that Fred has high self-esteem, if it is valid, Fred most likely really does have high self-esteem.
Issues of validity can come up anytime, but most often explicitly come up in psychology when researchers develop new measuring instruments.  How do we know that Dr. Smith’s new self-report scale measuring “motivation to watch TV sitcoms” actually measures motivation to watch sitcoms?  It doesn’t just because he says so.  He needs some sort of evidence.  Although a review of all the types of validity evidence is beyond the scope of this chapter, one type in particular, is very relevant.
“Known-groups” validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979) refers to validating a new questionnaire by administering it to groups who would be well-known to differ on the measure, if it really measured what it is supposed to measure.  For example, let’s say we could identify two groups of people: one group who watches 20 hours of sitcoms a week and another who never watch sitcoms.  If Dr. Smith’s measure is valid, the first group should score higher on Motivation to Watch Sitcoms than the second group.
Validity – one of the core, essential ingredients for any psychological research – takes for granted that groups differ in many ways, and uses that knowledge in the service of advancing science.  To use several examples more relevant to stereotypes than my sitcom one, on average, Whites should show more anti-Black prejudice on all sorts of measures than do African-Americans; Catholic priests should score higher on measures of religiosity than do atheists; and conservatives should score higher on measures of right wing authoritarianism than do liberals.  In this context, it is, apparently, not merely moral to believe that groups differ, but assumed and exploited by competent psychological scientists seeking to develop new instruments.  If exploiting “known” group differences is part of normal science, then “knowing” that groups differ (i.e., stereotyping them) cannot possibly be inherently immoral or necessarily flawed.